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# Decidable and Undecidable Extensions of $\mathcal{A L C}$ with Composition-Based Role Inclusion Axioms 

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#### Abstract

This paper continues our investigation on the extension of the standard description logic $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$ with role axioms of the form $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$. We consider the concept satisfiability problem of $\mathcal{A L C}$ w.r.t. a set of role axioms of the proposed form. A set of these role axioms is called a role box. The original motivation for this kind of role axioms comes from foreseen applications in the field of qualitative spatial reasoning with description logics. In this paper, we define the logics $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}, \mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, and $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$. Basically, both $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A} \ominus}$ and $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ allow arbitrary role boxes containing axioms of the general form $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$. In contrast to $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A} \Theta}, \mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ requires additionally that all roles have to be interpreted as disjoint. This requirement is also originally motivated by qualitative spatial reasoning applications with $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R A}}$. Recently it turned out that $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}} \ominus$ is undecidable. In fact, already $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L U}_{\mathcal{R A}} \ominus$ with role boxes containing axioms of the form $R \circ S \sqsubseteq T$ is undecidable. A very similar result has also been obtained independently in a branch of normal multimodal logics, called grammar logics. Since role disjointness is a very severe restriction it is currently still unknown whether $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ might be decidable or not. In this paper we go back one step before $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ and discuss a common fragment of $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ and $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A} \ominus}$, called $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$. Like in $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}, \mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ requires role disjointness, but the set of admissible role boxes is further pruned. It turned out that associativity of role boxes is an important requirement - exploiting associativity we were able to show the decidability and EXPTIME-completeness of $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$. Surprisingly, satisfiability of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$-concepts w.r.t. admissible role boxes can be reduced to concept satisfiability w.r.t. general TBoxes in $\mathcal{A L C}$. We also show that the further augmentation of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ with unqualified number restrictions, yielding the language $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$, is again undecidable.


## 1 Introduction and Motivation

Since the famous "Subsumption in KL-ONE is undecidable"-result by SchmidtSchauß ([14]) who identified the so-called role value maps as a primary source of undecidability in the seminal description-logic system KL-ONE, role inclusion expressions containing the composition operator have not regained much attention in the DL community again (please refer to [2] for a more gentle and self-contained introduction of description logics). A role value map is a conceptexpression of the form

$$
R_{1} \circ R_{2} \circ \cdots \circ R_{n} \sqsubseteq S_{1} \circ S_{2} \circ \cdots \circ S_{m},
$$

whose extension (assuming the usual extensional, Tarski-style semantics) is given by the set

$$
\left\{x \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \forall y:<x, y>\in R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ \ldots \circ R_{n}^{\mathcal{I}} \Rightarrow\left\langle x, y>\in S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ \ldots \circ S_{m}^{\mathcal{I}}\right\} .\right.
$$

Even though it was always clear that role value maps are expressive and elegant modeling constructs, only a very few restricted variants have been examined. For example, Molitor (see [9]) has shown that a certain fragment of $\mathcal{A L C}$ with role value maps of the special form $R_{1} \circ R_{2} \circ \cdots \circ R_{n} \sqsubseteq S_{1} \circ S_{2} \circ \cdots \circ S_{n}$ - note that the same number of roles appear on both sides of the inclusion - is decidable, by exploiting a certain "level structure" in the models. In our opinion, there is still a gap in the description logic theory. As pointed out by Sattler in [12], these restricted variants of role value maps still need to be investigated, since they might be decidable and very useful for knowledge representation purposes.
In this paper, we continue our research on $\mathcal{A L C}$ extended with composition-based role inclusion axioms of the form $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$ (see [16],[15]) and identify a decidable fragment. A role axiom $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$ is satisfied by an interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ if and only if $S^{\mathcal{I}} \circ T^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \cup R_{2}^{\mathcal{I}} \cup \cdots \cup R_{n}^{\mathcal{I}}$ holds. The most obvious consequence is the loss of the tree model property. Even worse, the logics we have considered don't have the finite model property. On one hand, our investigation can also be seen as an attempt towards contributing to the identification of decidable variants of role value maps. Our role axioms are not role value maps per se, since, for example, role value maps might appear negated if the considered base-description logic offers a full negation operator. But there is still an interesting correspondence with role value maps: if we restrict ourselves to deterministic composition-based role inclusion axioms (a composition-based role axiom is called deterministic iff it contains no disjunctions of roles on its right hand side) we might say, laxly speaking, that non-negated (positive) role value maps are "local" deterministic composition-based role inclusion axioms, or
conversely, that deterministic composition-based role-axioms are "global" (positive) role value maps. ${ }^{1}$

On the other hand, the proposed kind of role axioms arises naturally when trying to address qualitative spatial reasoning tasks within description logic frameworks, which was the original motivation for considering these kinds of role axioms. Due to the problems encountered in our previous work (see [16], [15]), the primary objective of this paper is to get a better map of the borderline area between decidable and undecidable extensions of $\mathcal{A L C}$ with compositionbased role inclusion axioms.

Certain well-known description logic constructs can be "emulated" with the help of role axioms having the form $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$. For example, a transitively closed role $R$ corresponds to an axiom $R \circ R \sqsubseteq R$. This is the $\mathcal{R}^{+}$"operator" of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$(see [10]). Simple role inclusion axioms of the form $R \sqsubseteq S$ (the $\mathcal{H}$ operator) can be emulated with $R \circ I d \sqsubseteq S$ in the presence of the identity role $I d$, having the fixed semantics of the identity relation. Also the concept satisfiability problem of the language $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \oplus}$, offering so-called transitive orbits (see [10]), can be reduced to concept satisfiability in $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ $\left(\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A} \Theta}\right)$ w.r.t. a set of appropriate role axioms (see [15]). Since these are all well-known decidable description logics, it was always clear that certain "trivial" classes of role boxes could be found, such that the resulting logic would be decidable (see the discussion in [15]). However, it remained to show that there are any non-obvious classes of role boxes not corresponding to previously known decidable description logics for which this is also the case.
In this paper we identify the fragment $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, offering admissible role boxes. Admissible role boxes (see below for an exact definition) are associative and contain only deterministic role axioms (no role axiom has disjunctions on its right hand side). The decidability result is not immediate, since $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ does not have the finite model property. In previous work it turned out that $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ and even $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L U}_{\mathcal{R A} \ominus}$ with role boxes solely containing axioms of the form $R \circ S \sqsubseteq T$ is undecidable. A very similar undecidability result has also been obtained independently in a branch of normal multimodal logics, called grammar logics (see below for a discussion). Since role disjointness is a very severe restriction it is currently still unknown whether $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ might be decidable or not. With $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ we go back on step behind $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$. Like in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{R A}}, \mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ requires role disjointness, but the set of admissible role boxes is further pruned, compared to $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$. It turned out that associativity of role boxes is an important requirement - exploiting associativity we were able to show the decidability of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$. We also show EXPTIME-completeness of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$. Surprisingly,

[^0]it turns out that satisfiability of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$-concepts w.r.t. admissible role boxes can be reduced to concept satisfiability w.r.t. general TBoxes in $\mathcal{A L C}$. We like to mention that $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, even though clearly a very restricted language, is at least as expressive as $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$and $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{\oplus}}$ (see [10]). Therefore, the given reduction works also for $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$and $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{\oplus}}$.

The structure of this paper is a follows: we will first define the syntax and semantics of the languages $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}, \mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, and $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$. Certain auxiliary definitions and propositions as well as already known undecidability results and facts from [15] are recalled. We will then briefly sketch the relationship to grammar logics. The next chapter, which contains a tableaux-based decision procedure for $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ and the proof of EXPTIME-completeness, is the main contribution of this paper. We then show that a slight extension of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, namely $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ extended with unqualified number restrictions (code letter $\mathcal{N}$ ) yielding the logic $\mathcal{A L C N}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$, is undecidable again. Finally, we conclude by discussing the impact of the insights gained from $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ on future work.

## 2 Syntax and Semantics

In the following we will define the syntax and semantics of the three considered languages $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}, \mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A} \Theta}$, and $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$. We start with the set of well-formed concept expressions (concepts for short):

Definition 1 (Concept Expressions) Let $\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}}$ be a set of concept names, and let $\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}$ be a set of role names (roles for short), such that $\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}} \cap \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}=\emptyset$. The set of concept expressions (or concepts for short) is defined inductively:

1. Every concept name $C \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}}$ is a concept.
2. If $C$ and $D$ are concepts, and $R \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}$ is a role, then the following expressions are concepts as well: $(\neg C),(C \sqcap D),(C \sqcup D),(\exists R . C)$, and ( $\forall$ R.C).

The set of concepts is the same as for the language $\mathcal{A L C}$. If a concept starts with "(", we call it a compound concept, otherwise a concept name or atomic concept. Brackets may be omitted for the sake of readability if the concept is still uniquely parsable. For example, instead of $((C \sqcap D) \sqcap E)$ we simply write $C \sqcap D \sqcap E$ etc., similarly for $\sqcup(\sqcap$ and $\sqcup$ are considered as being left-associative). Generally, if $C$ is a compound concept, the brackets of $C=(\ldots)$ may not be omitted within $\exists R . C$ and $\forall R . C$. If $C$ is a concept name and we write $\exists R . C \sqcap D$, with this convention this means $(\exists R . C) \sqcap D$ and not $\exists R .(C \sqcap D)$. We may also omit the brackets when nesting $\exists$ - and $\forall$-concepts: e.g. $\exists R . \exists R . \exists R . C \sqcap D$
means $((\exists R .(\exists R .(\exists R . C))) \sqcap D)$. If $C$ is not a concept name we have to write $\exists R . \exists R . \exists R .(\ldots) \sqcap D$ to mean $(\exists R .(\exists R .(\exists R .(C \sqcap D))))$. We use the following abbreviations: if $R_{1}, \ldots, R_{n}$ are roles, and $C$ is a concept, then we define $\left(\forall R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n} . C\right)=_{\text {def }}\left(\forall R_{1} . C\right) \sqcap \cdots \sqcap\left(\forall R_{n} . C\right)$ and $\exists R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n} . C==_{\text {def }}$ $\left(\exists R_{1} \cdot C\right) \sqcup \cdots \sqcup\left(\exists R_{n} . C\right)$. Additionally, for some $C N \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}}$ we define $\top={ }_{\text {def }}$ $C N \sqcup \neg C N$ and $\perp=_{\text {def }} C N \sqcap \neg C N$ (therefore, $\top^{\mathcal{I}}=\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \perp^{\mathcal{I}}=\emptyset$ ). Before we can proceed, we need some auxiliary definitions. The set of roles being used within a concept $C$ is defined:

Definition 2 (Used Roles, roles $(C)$ )

$$
\operatorname{roles}(C)=_{\text {def }} \begin{cases}\emptyset & \text { if } C \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}} \\ \operatorname{roles}(D) & \text { if } C=(\neg D) \\ \operatorname{roles}(D) \cup \operatorname{roles}(E) & \text { if } C=(D \sqcap E) \\ & \text { or } C=(D \sqcup E) \\ \{R\} \cup \operatorname{roles}(D) & \text { if } C=(\exists R . D) \\ & \text { or } C=(\forall R . D)\end{cases}
$$

For example, $\operatorname{roles}(((\forall R .(\exists S . C)) \sqcap \exists T . D))=\{R, S, T\}$.
The set of subconcepts of a concept $C$ is defined in the obvious way:
Definition 3 (Subconcepts of $C$, sub $(C)$ )

$$
\operatorname{sub}(C)={ }_{\text {def }}\{C\} \cup \begin{cases}\emptyset & \text { if } C \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}} \\ \operatorname{sub}(D) & \text { if } C=(\neg D) \\ & \text { or } C=(\exists R . D) \\ & \text { or } C=(\forall R . D) \\ \operatorname{sub}(D) \cup \operatorname{sub}(E) & \text { if } C=(D \sqcap E) \\ & \text { or } C=(D \sqcup E)\end{cases}
$$

For example, $\operatorname{sub}((C \sqcap(\forall R . D)))=\{(C \sqcap(\forall R . D)), C,(\forall R . D), D\}$. Obviously, $|\operatorname{sub}(C)| \leq|C|$, if $|C|$ denotes the length of the string expressing $C$.

As already noted, we are investigating the satisfiability of $\mathcal{A L C}$ concepts w.r.t. a set of role axioms of the form $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$. More formally, the syntax of these role axioms and of the considered role boxes containing these axioms is as follows. The following definitions and notions might appear to be complicated and artificial at a first sight, but the reasons for introducing them will become clear subsequently. As already noted, the primary objective of this paper is not to introduce a useful new description logic of utmost utility, but to investigate different kinds of restricted role boxes that ensure decidability. Even though some of the subsequent restrictions on role boxes are very strong and artificial we believe that some of the restrictions can be relaxed in order to
define more and more useful description logics in the future, by exploiting some of the insights gained by this investigation: ${ }^{2}$

Definition 4 (Role Axioms, Role Box, Admissible Role Box) If
$S, T, R_{1}, \ldots, R_{n} \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}$, then the expression $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}, n \geq 1$, is called a role axiom. If $r a=S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$, then pre $(r a)={ }_{d e f}(S, T)$ and $\operatorname{con}(r a)={ }_{\text {def }}\left\{R_{1}, \ldots, R_{n}\right\}$.
If $n=1$, then $r a$ is called a deterministic role axiom. In this case we also write $T=\operatorname{con}(r a)$ instead of $T \in \operatorname{con}(r a)$.
A finite set $\mathfrak{R}$ of role axioms is called a role box.
Let $\operatorname{roles}(r a)={ }_{\text {def }}\left\{S, T, R_{1}, \ldots, R_{n}\right\}$, and $\operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})==_{d e f} \bigcup_{r a \in \mathfrak{R}} \operatorname{roles}(r a)$.
A role box $\Re$ is called deterministic, iff it contains only deterministic role axioms.

A role box $\mathfrak{R}$ is called functional, iff $\forall r a_{1}, r a_{2} \in \mathfrak{R}: \operatorname{pre}\left(r a_{1}\right)=\operatorname{pre}\left(r a_{2}\right) \Rightarrow$ $r a_{1}=r a_{2}$. We can then use the function $\mathrm{ra}(S, T)=r a$ to refer to the unique role axiom $r a$ with pre $(r a)=(S, T)$ and define $\operatorname{con}(S, T)=_{d e f} \operatorname{con}(\operatorname{ra}(S, T))$.
A role box $\mathfrak{R}$ is called complete, $\quad$ iff $\forall R, S \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R}): \exists r a \in \mathfrak{R}: \operatorname{pre}(r a)=$ $(R, S)$.
Let $\mathfrak{R}$ be a functional role box, $C$ be a concept, and $R_{\text {? }} \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}$, but $R_{\text {? }} \notin$ $\operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R}) \cup \operatorname{roles}(C)$. Then, the completion of $\mathfrak{R}$ w.r.t. the concept $C$ is defined as the role box

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathfrak{R}(C)=\text { def } \mathfrak{R} \cup\left\{R \circ S \sqsubseteq \sqcup_{T \in\left(\left\{R_{?}\right\} \cup \operatorname{roles}(C) \cup \text { roles }(\Re)\right)} T\right. \\
& \left.\quad \neg(\exists r a \in \mathfrak{R}: \operatorname{pre}(r a)=(R, S)), R, S \in\left(\left\{R_{?}\right\} \cup \operatorname{roles}(C) \cup \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})\right)\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Obviously, $\mathfrak{R}(C)$ is a complete and functional role box. Please note that, even if $\mathfrak{R}$ is already complete w.r.t. $C$ such that $\forall R, S \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R}) \cup \operatorname{roles}(C): \exists r a \in$ $\mathfrak{R}: \operatorname{pre}(r a)=(R, S)$, we would still have $\mathfrak{R}(C) \neq \mathfrak{R}$, due to the addition of role axioms $r a \in \mathfrak{R}(C) \backslash \mathfrak{R}$ with $R_{\text {? }} \in \operatorname{pre}(r a)$.

The role box $\mathfrak{R}$ is called admissible iff it is deterministic, functional, complete, and associative: $\forall R, S, T: \operatorname{con}(\operatorname{con}(R, S), T)=\operatorname{con}(R, \operatorname{con}(S, T))$.
The role box $\mathfrak{R}$ is called admissible for the concept $C$ iff $\mathfrak{R}$ is admissible and additionally, $\operatorname{roles}(C) \subseteq \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})$.

[^1]According to the classes of allowed role boxes, we define $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A} \ominus}, \mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A} \ominus}$ and $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ as follows:

- In $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}} \ominus$ we allow all role boxes.
- In $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ we allow only functional role boxes. The following holds: if $\mathfrak{R}$ is a functional role box, then $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is satisfiable iff $(C, \mathfrak{R}(C))$ is, where $\mathfrak{R}(C)$ is the completion of $\mathfrak{R}$ w.r.t. $C$ (the proof is pretty obvious and left out here for the sake of brevity). For the semantics, we require that all roles must be interpreted as disjoint, see below. ${ }^{3}$
- In $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ we allow only role boxes that are admissible (see above) w.r.t. the considered concept $C$. We are studying the concept satisfiability problem of $(C, \mathfrak{R})$. Like in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, we require that all roles must be interpreted as disjoint, see below. An admissible role box can be seen as defining the operation-table of a $\mathcal{S}$ emi- $\mathcal{G}$ roup (therefore the suffix $\mathcal{S G}$ ). For example, if we consider the operation-table of " + " modulo 4 on the natural numbers

| + | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 |

and interpret " + " as " $\circ$ ", and assign for each number $i$ a unique role name $R_{i}$, we get an admissible role box. Then, $\left(\exists R_{1} \cdot \exists R_{2} . C\right) \sqcap \forall R_{3} . \neg C$ is unsatisfiable w.r.t. this role box.
We like to mention that $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, even though clearly a very restricted language, is a least as expressive as $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$and $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{\oplus}}$.

[^2]In order to demonstrate the consequences of disjointness for roles, please consider
$\mathfrak{R}=\{R \circ S \sqsubseteq A \sqcup B, S \circ T \sqsubseteq X \sqcup Y, A \circ T \sqsubseteq U, B \circ T \sqsubseteq V, R \circ X \sqsubseteq U, R \circ Y \sqsubseteq V\}$.
Then,

$$
(\exists R .((\exists S . \exists T . \top) \sqcap \forall Y . \perp) \sqcap \forall A . \perp, \mathfrak{R}(C))
$$

is unsatisfiable, since $\forall A . \perp$ forces to choose $B \in \operatorname{con}(R, S)$, and $\forall Y . \perp$ forces to choose $X \in \operatorname{con}(S, T)$. Due to $B \circ T \sqsubseteq V$ and $R \circ X \sqsubseteq U$ there must be a nonempty intersection between $U$ and $V$. The unsatisfiability is caused by a subtle interplay between the role box and the concept. Please observe that this role box is "associative" in a more general sense (since $(R \circ S) \circ T=\{U, V\}=R \circ(S \circ T)$ ), but not admissible in the sense defined here. Summing up, this example is satisfiable in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, but unsatisfiable in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$. Since the role box is not admissible, the example is not expressible in $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$.
Additionally, a set of concept inclusion axioms (GCIs) can be specified. A set of these axioms is called a general (or free) TBox:

Definition 5 (Generalized Concept Inclusion Axiom, General TBox) If $C$ and $D$ are $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$-concepts, then the expression $C \sqsubseteq D$ is called a generalized concept inclusion axiom, or GCI for short. A finite set of GCI's is called a general (or free) TBox, $\mathfrak{T}$. We use $C \doteq D \in \mathfrak{T}$ as a shorthand for $\{C \doteq D, D \dot{\doteq} C\} \subseteq \mathfrak{T}$. We define $\operatorname{sub}(\mathfrak{T})={ }_{\text {def }}\{G \mid E \sqsubseteq F \in \mathfrak{T}, G \in \operatorname{sub}(E) \cup \operatorname{sub}(F)\}$, and roles $(\mathfrak{T})={ }_{\text {def }}$ $\{R \mid G \in \operatorname{sub}(\mathfrak{T}), R \in \operatorname{roles}(G)\}$.

The semantics of a concept is specified by giving a Tarski-style interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ that has to satisfy the following conditions:

Definition 6 (Interpretation) An interpretation $\mathcal{I}={ }_{\operatorname{def}}\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}},,^{\mathcal{I}}\right)$ consists of a non-empty set $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, called the domain of $\mathcal{I}$, and an interpretation function $\cdot \mathcal{I}$ that maps every concept name to a subset of $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, and every role name to a subset of $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \times \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$.

In case of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ and $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, we additionally require that for all roles $R, S \in$ $\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}, R \neq S: R^{\mathcal{I}} \cap S^{\mathcal{I}}=\emptyset$. All roles are interpreted as disjoint then.

The following functions on $\mathcal{I}$ will be used: The universal relation of $\mathcal{I}$ is defined as $\mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I})={ }_{\text {def }} \bigcup_{R \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}} R^{\mathcal{I}}$, and the universal relation w.r.t. a set of role names $\mathcal{R}$ as $\mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{R})={ }_{\text {def }} \bigcup_{R \in \mathcal{R}} R^{\mathcal{I}}$.
The skeleton of $\mathcal{I}$ is defined as $\operatorname{SKE} \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{I})={ }_{\text {def }}$
$\left\{\langle x, z\rangle \in \mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I}) \mid \nexists y \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}: x \neq y, y \neq z,\langle x, y\rangle \in \mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I}),\langle y, z\rangle \in \mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I})\right\}$.

If $\langle i, j\rangle \in \operatorname{SKE} \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{I})$, the edge is called a direct edge, otherwise an indirect edge. If $\langle i, j\rangle \in \mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I})$, the edge is called an incoming edge for $j$.
Given an interpretation $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, every (possibly compound) concept $C$ can be uniquely interpreted (resp. "evaluated") by using the following definitions (we write $X^{\mathcal{I}}$ instead of $\left.\cdot{ }^{\mathcal{I}}(X)\right)$ :

$$
\begin{array}{rll}
(\neg C)^{\mathcal{I}} & =_{\text {def }} & \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \backslash C^{\mathcal{I}} \\
(C \sqcap D)^{\mathcal{I}} & =_{\text {def }} & C^{\mathcal{I}} \cap D^{\mathcal{I}} \\
(C \sqcup D)^{\mathcal{I}} & =_{\text {def }} & C^{\mathcal{I}} \cup D^{\mathcal{I}} \\
(\exists R . C)^{\mathcal{I}} & =_{\text {def }} & \left\{i \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \exists j \in C^{\mathcal{I}}:<i, j>\in R^{\mathcal{I}}\right\} \\
(\forall R . C)^{\mathcal{I}} & =\text { def } \quad\left\{i \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \forall j:<i, j>\in R^{\mathcal{I}} \Rightarrow j \in C^{\mathcal{I}}\right\}
\end{array}
$$

It is therefore sufficient to provide the interpretations for the concept names and roles, since the extension $C^{\mathcal{I}}$ of every concept $C$ is uniquely determined then.

In the following we specify under which conditions a given interpretation is a model of a syntactic entity (we also say an interpretation satisfies a syntactic entity):

Definition 7 (The Model Relationship) An interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of a concept $C$, written $\mathcal{I} \models C$, iff $C^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$.
An interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of a role axiom $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$, written $\mathcal{I} \models S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$, iff $S^{\mathcal{I}} \circ T^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \cup \cdots \cup R_{n}^{\mathcal{I}}$.

An interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of a role box $\mathfrak{R}$, written $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{R}$, iff for all role axioms $r a \in \mathfrak{R}: \mathcal{I} \models r a$.
An interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of a GCI $C \dot{\sqsubseteq}$, written $\mathcal{I} \models C \dot{亡}$, iff $C^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq D^{\mathcal{I}}$.
An interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of a TBox $\mathfrak{T}$, written $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{T}$, iff for all GCIs $g \in \mathfrak{T}: \mathcal{I} \models g$.
An interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of $(C, \mathfrak{R})$, written $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{R})$, iff $\mathcal{I} \models C$ and $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{R}$.
An interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of $(C, \mathfrak{T})$, written $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{T}), \quad$ iff $\mathcal{I} \models C$ and $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{T}$.

An interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of $(C, \mathfrak{R}, \mathfrak{T})$, written $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{R}, \mathfrak{T})$, iff $\mathcal{I} \models C$, $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{R}$ and $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{T}$.

An important relationship between concepts is the subsumption relationship, which is a partial ordering on concepts w.r.t. their specificity:

Definition 8 (Subsumption Relationship) A concept $D$ subsumes a concept $C, C \sqsubseteq D$ (w.r.t. to $\mathfrak{T}$ and/or $\mathfrak{R}$ ), iff $C^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq D^{\mathcal{I}}$ holds for all interpretations $\mathcal{I}$ (that are also models of $\mathfrak{T}$ and/or $\mathfrak{R}$, respectively).

We like to mention that the three proposed logics are expressive enough to allow for the so-called internalization of general TBoxes.
Since a full negation operator if provided, the subsumption problem can be reduced to the concept satisfiability problem: $C \sqsubseteq D$ iff $C \sqcap \neg D$ is unsatisfiable.
It should be noticed that a satisfiability tester for any of the three proposed logics would also be able to determine satisfiability resp. subsumption w.r.t. general TBoxes (see below; internalization of $\mathfrak{T}$ can be used).
For the following proofs we need some auxiliary propositions which are obviously true and deserve no proofs:

Proposition 1 If $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{R})$, then for every interpretation $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}=\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}^{\prime}\right)$ with $D^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}=D^{\mathcal{I}}$ for all concept names $D \in \operatorname{sub}(C) \cap \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}}$ and $R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}=R^{\mathcal{I}}$ for all role names $R \in \operatorname{roles}(C, \mathfrak{R}): \mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models(C, \mathfrak{R})$.

Proposition $2(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is satisfiable $\mathrm{iff}(\operatorname{NNF}(C), \mathfrak{R})$ is satisfiable. $\operatorname{NNF}(C)$ returns the negation normal form of $C$, in which the negation sign appears only in front of atomic concept names. The NNF can be obtained by "pushing the negation sign inwards", e.g. by exhaustively applying the rules $\neg\left(\neg C_{1}\right) \rightarrow C_{1}$, $\neg\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right) \rightarrow \neg C_{1} \sqcup \neg C_{2}, \neg\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right) \rightarrow \neg C_{1} \sqcap \neg C_{2}, \neg \forall R . C_{1} \rightarrow \exists R . \neg C_{1}$ and $\neg \exists R . C_{1} \rightarrow \forall R . \neg C_{1}$. In the following we assume w.l.o.g. that $C$ is in NNF.

Proposition 3 Neither $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}, \mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, nor $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ have the finite model property, i.e. there are pairs $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ that have no finite models.

Proof 1 As a counter-example to a finite model property assumption in $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, please consider
$(\exists R . \exists R . \top) \sqcap(\forall S . \exists R . \top)$
w.r.t.

$$
\{R \circ R \sqsubseteq S, R \circ S \sqsubseteq S, S \circ R \sqsubseteq S, S \circ S \sqsubseteq S\},
$$

which has no finite model (see [16],[15] for a proof). Since this is clearly also an admissible role-box for the considered concept term, this also shows that $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ does not have the finite model property. Concerning $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, the proposition follows indirectly, since $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}} \ominus$ is undecidable (see [15]). It is wellknown that a description logic is decidable, if it has the finite model property
and can be reduced to first-order predicate logic formulas. Since the latter is true, the former must be false, because $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, would be decidable otherwise.

## 3 The Relationship to Grammar Logics

Recently it turned out that there is an interesting correspondence of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}} \ominus$ with a special class of normal multimodal logics called inclusion modal logics, or grammar logics (see [4],[3]). The correspondence has been pointed out by Demri ([4]). We will only briefly sketch the basic idea of inclusion modal logics, see [3] for a thorough discussion. Demri also provides an undecidability proof for $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A} \Theta}$, based on the original proof of Baldoni who showed that context-free grammar logics are undecidable, but the $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A}}$ undecidability result in [15] has been found independently from Demri's and Baldoni's proofs and without any knowledge of the correspondence. The proof is given by a reduction from the (undecidable) non-empty intersection problem of a special class of contextfree grammars which are similar to context-free grammars in Chomsky Normal Form. ${ }^{4}$

The original motivation for the introduction of grammar logics was to simulate the behavior of formal grammars by means of modal logic. Grammar logics are characterized by a set of modal inclusion axiom schemas of the form $\left[t_{1}\right]\left[t_{2}\right] \ldots\left[t_{n}\right] \psi \Rightarrow\left[s_{1}\right]\left[s_{2}\right] \ldots\left[s_{m}\right] \psi$. The intended idea was that each production rule $t_{1} t_{2} \ldots t_{n} \rightarrow s_{1} s_{2} \ldots s_{m}$ of a formal grammar gives rise to one modal inclusion axiom schema of the form $\left[t_{1}\right]\left[t_{2}\right] \ldots\left[t_{n}\right] \psi \Rightarrow\left[s_{1}\right]\left[s_{2}\right] \ldots\left[s_{m}\right] \psi$ (please note that $\Rightarrow$ means implication, whereas $\rightarrow$ means "derives in one step"). In [3] it is shown that a set of inclusion axiom schemas characterizes a special class of frames $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{A}}$, called inclusion frames, in which for each inclusion axiom schema an appropriate inclusion relationship between the accessibility relations $\mathcal{R}_{i}$ holds; as usual, $\mathcal{R}_{i}$ is the accessibility relation corresponding to the modality [i]. It is shown that each axiom schema $\left[t_{1}\right]\left[t_{2}\right] \ldots\left[t_{n}\right] \psi \Rightarrow\left[s_{1}\right]\left[s_{2}\right] \ldots\left[s_{m}\right] \psi$ characterizes the class of inclusion frames $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{A}}$ where $\mathcal{R}_{s_{1}} \circ \mathcal{R}_{s_{2}} \circ \cdots \circ \mathcal{R}_{s_{m}} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{t_{1}} \circ \mathcal{R}_{t_{2}} \circ \cdots \circ \mathcal{R}_{t_{n}}$ holds; similar as, for example, the modal logic axiom schema $T=[a] \psi \Rightarrow \psi$ characterizes the class of frames where $\mathcal{R}_{a}$ is reflexive (see [5]). ${ }^{5}$
In description logic terminology, the accessibility relations correspond to inter-

[^3]preted roles (e.g. the accessibility relation $\mathcal{R}_{R}$ corresponds to $R^{\mathcal{I}}$ ). If an appropriate class of inclusion frames $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is considered, an inclusion axiom schema of the form $[T] \psi \Rightarrow[R][S] \psi$ corresponds to a role axiom of the form $R \circ S \sqsubseteq$ $T$. Appropriate means that $\mathcal{R}_{R} \circ \mathcal{R}_{S} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{T}$ has to hold. As an example, w.r.t. the class of Kripke interpretations that are based on such appropriate frames $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{A}}$, the formula $(\langle R\rangle\langle S\rangle p) \wedge[T] \neg p$ is unsatisfiable. The same holds for ( $(\exists R . \exists S . p) \sqcap \forall T . \neg p,\{R \circ S \sqsubseteq T\})$, since the role axiom enforces the appropriate "inclusion property" $R^{\mathcal{I}} \circ S^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq T^{\mathcal{I}}$. Considering the modal logic formula, one has to observe that there are indeed Kripke interpretations where this formula is satisfiable; i.e. a broader class of models than in the $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A} \ominus}$ equivalent is admitted. However, these Kripke interpretations are not based on appropriate inclusion frames $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{A}}$, where $\mathcal{R}_{R} \circ \mathcal{R}_{S} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{T}$ holds.

By analyzing various types of grammars, certain decidability and undecidability results concerning satisfiability (validity) of formulas w.r.t. Kripke interpretations that are based on appropriate inclusion frames have been found: it is already shown in [3] that the validity problem for the class of context-free inclusion modal logics is undecidable. It should be noted that $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ even admits axioms of the form $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$ which correspond to modal axiom schemas of the form $\left(\left[R_{1}\right] \psi\right) \wedge\left(\left[R_{2}\right] \psi\right) \wedge \cdots \wedge\left(\left[R_{n}\right] \psi\right) \Rightarrow[S][T] \psi,{ }^{6}$ and these axiom schemas are not in the class of inclusion modal logics. However, in the undecidability proof of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ it is shown that already $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{R A}} \ominus$ with deterministic role boxes is undecidable. Therefore, this undecidable fragment can indeed be understood as an inclusion modal logic and one could claim that the undecidability of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A} \ominus}$ is already an obvious consequence from the work in [3]. However, the correspondence was unknown until Demri's paper (see [4]).

## $4 \mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$ is EXPTIME-Complete

In the following, we design a decision procedure for $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ : given a concept $C$ and a role box $\Re$ that is admissible for $C$ (recall that a role box is admissible for a concept $C$ iff it is deterministic, functional, complete, associative and roles $(C) \subseteq$ roles $(\mathfrak{R})$ ) as input to the algorithm SAT, the algorithm decides whether there is a model $\mathcal{I}$ of $(C, \mathfrak{R}): \mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{R})$. We adopt and adapt the proof-techniques firstly used by Horrocks, Sattler et al. (e.g., see [7, 8]).
In a similar way as for other description logics, the decision procedure is given by means of a non-deterministic tableaux algorithm that constructs a so-called finite completion tree. Soundness of this algorithm is proven by showing that a socalled tableau can be constructed from a complete and clash-free completion tree

[^4]that has been generated by the algorithm. Completeness is proven by showing how to construct a clash-free completion tree from a given tableau. Before we can proceed with the algorithm, we therefore need to define the auxiliary data structure tableau, which will turn out to be an appropriate abstraction of a special class of models.

At a first sight it might not make sense to define a tableaux algorithm for such a restricted description logic like $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ (again, recall that it is at least as expressive as $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$). However, the calculus is presented in the form given here for a number of reasons:

1. It is very similar to the calculus which has been given for $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ in [16]. The basic ideas are identical. Therefore, defining the $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ calculus in this way might yield new insights on the decidability status of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$.
2. The given calculus should be extendible. We are planning to investigate different (less restricted) classes of role boxes with the same calculus by making only small changes to the blocking condition and/or the so-called $\exists \forall$-rule (see below).
3. For the same reason, the calculus and the definition of tableaus are slightly more complicated than needed. This has also the additional advantage that some properties can be proven more easily. Hopefully, this allows for an adaptation of the framework if a less-restricted class of role boxes is considered, without having to redesign everything.
4. We wanted to demonstrate that the basic ideas behind the $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$calculus (see [10]) can be further stretched, applying also to more general logics like $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$. In fact, the $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$ calculus might be seen as a generalization of some of the ideas present in the $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$calculus ("propagating" constraints of the form " $\forall R . C$ ", where $R$ is a transitively closed role).
5. The given (non-deterministic) tableaux calculus is not optimal in terms of computational complexity. As shown below, $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$ is EXPTIMEcomplete, but the calculus is not an EXPTIME-decision procedure. Therefore, in order to prove the upper-bound complexity of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, a different method was needed. We give an EXPTIME-reduction to $\mathcal{A L C}$-satisfiability w.r.t. general TBoxes. Therefore, an arbitrary $\mathcal{A L C}$-reasoner that can handle GCIs could be used to decide $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$-satisfiability. However, the reduction was designed to show EXPTIME-completeness and would likely not be efficient when used as an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$-decision procedure. A startingpoint for an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$-reasoner would therefore be the given tableaux calculus, since it will be much more efficient in the average case and might also be augmentable with special optimization techniques.

### 4.1 The Tableau

Basically, a tableau is a possibly infinite tree whose edges $\mathcal{E}$ are labeled with role names, and whose nodes are labeled with constraints enforced on these nodes (see [8]). The node labeling function is called $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}$, and we write $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ to refer to the label of node $x$. The elements of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ are called constraints. Since edges are labeled with role names, we refer to the set of edges corresponding to a given role $R \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}$ as $\mathcal{E}_{R}$.
A tableau for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is just an other representation of a special model $\mathcal{I}$ of $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ (please note that $C$ is already in NNF, see Proposition 2). We call these models tree skeleton models.

Let $\mathcal{I}$ be the tree skeleton model corresponding to some given tableau. Then, $\mathcal{S K E L}(\mathcal{I})$ corresponds to the labeled tree of this tableau. If a node $y$ in the tableau is an $R$-successor of the node $x$ due to some constraint $\exists R \ldots$ enforced on node $x, \exists R \ldots \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then w.r.t. $\mathcal{I}$ we have $\langle x, y\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}} \cap \mathcal{S K E} \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{I})$; i.e. $\langle x, y\rangle$ is a direct $R$-edge. However, the indirect edges which might be present in $\mathcal{I}$ due to role axioms cannot be represented in the tableau in this way, since a tableau is a labeled tree. For example, if $R \circ S \sqsubseteq T$, then a model $\mathcal{I}$ with $\left\langle x_{0}, x_{1}\right\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}},\left\langle x_{1}, x_{2}\right\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$ must satisfy $\left\langle x_{0}, x_{2}\right\rangle \in T^{\mathcal{I}}$. Therefore, every (direct or indirect) incoming edge for a node $x$ in the model is represented in the tableau by a special annotated all constraint of the form $(\forall U . D)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, where $S$ represents the type of the incoming edge, and $w$ is a word of role names, denoting a path in the tree, leading from the individual from which the edge originates to $x$. In our example we would have $(\forall \ldots)_{T, R S} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{2}\right)$ due to $\left.\left.<x_{0}, x_{2}\right\rangle \in T^{\mathcal{I}},<x_{0}, x_{1}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}},\left\langle x_{1}, x_{2}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{S}}$, and $(\forall \ldots)_{S, S} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{2}\right)$ due to $\left\langle x_{1}, x_{2}\right\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}},\left\langle x_{1}, x_{2}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{S}}$. Assume that $\forall U . D \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{0}\right)$. Then, the presence of the constraint $(\forall U . D)_{T, R S} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{2}\right)$ is ensured (see below). Since $x_{2}$ is an indirect $T$-successor of $x_{0}$ and not a $U$-successor, $D \notin \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{2}\right)$. If we additionally had $\forall T . D \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{0}\right)$, then also $(\forall T . D)_{T, R S} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{2}\right)$, and $D \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{2}\right)$. Whenever a constraint $(\forall U . D)_{T, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ with $U=T$ is encountered, $D \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ is ensured, since the qualification is applicable to the node $x$. Since the indirect edges are represented by constraints of the form $(\forall U . D)_{T, w}$, it is necessary to ensure the presence of them. This is achieved by adding a "dummy constraint" of the form $\forall R_{\text {? }} \cdot T$ for some $R_{\text {? }} \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}$ to the label of each node in the tableau.
In order to facilitate the subsequent definitions, the following auxiliary data structure is defined:

Definition 9 (Concept Tree) Let $C$ be a concept and $\mathfrak{R}$ be an admissible role box for $C$. A concept tree for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is a tuple $\left(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\right)$, where $\mathcal{N}$ is a set of nodes and $\mathcal{E} \subseteq \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{N}$ is a set of edges. The graph $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{E})$ is a
(possibly infinite) tree. The (total) labeling function $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}: \mathcal{E} \rightarrow \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})$ associates edges with role names. For a role $R \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})$, the set of $R$-edges is $\mathcal{E}_{R}=_{\text {def }}\left\{\langle x, y\rangle \mid(\langle x, y\rangle, R) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\right\}$. Additionally, $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}$ is a (total) node labeling function: $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}: \mathcal{N} \rightarrow \operatorname{sub}(C) \cup\left\{\forall R_{\text {? }} \cdot \top\right\} \cup$

$$
\begin{gathered}
\left\{\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S, w} \mid \forall R . C_{1} \in \operatorname{sub}(C) \text { or } \forall R . C_{1}=\forall R ? . \top,\right. \\
\left.R, S \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R}), w \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})^{+}\right\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

The elements in the domain of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}$ are also called constraints.. If $\langle x, y\rangle \in \mathcal{E}$, $y$ is called a successor of $x$, and $x$ is called a predecessor of $y$. If $\langle x, y\rangle \in$ $\mathcal{E}^{+}, x$ is called an ancestor of $y$, and $y$ is called a descendant of $x$. Let $\mathrm{w}_{-}$ancestor $(y, w)=_{\text {def }} x$ iff $w=R_{1} R_{2} \ldots R_{n}$, where $w \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})^{+},\left\langle x, x_{1}\right\rangle \in$ $\mathcal{E}_{R_{1}},\left\langle x_{1}, x_{2}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{R_{2}}, \ldots,\left\langle x_{n-1}, y\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{R_{n}}$. Please note that the w_ancestor is uniquely defined, since we have a tree.

A tableau can then be defined as follows:
Definition 10 (Tableau) A tableau $\mathcal{T}$ for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is a concept tree for which the following additional conditions hold:

1. There is some node $x_{0} \in \mathcal{N}$ with $C \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{0}\right)$.
2. For all $x, y \in \mathcal{N}$, for all $C_{i} \in \operatorname{sub}(C)$, and for all $\left(\forall R_{i} . C_{i}\right)_{S_{i}, w} \in \mathcal{L}$ with $R, R_{i}, S, S_{i} \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R}), w \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})^{+}$, and for some $R_{\text {? }} \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})$, we have
(a) if $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then $\left(\neg C_{1}\right) \notin \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$,
(b) if $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ and $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$,
(c) if $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ or $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$,
(d) if $\left(\exists R . C_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then there is some $y$ such that $\langle x, y\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{R}$ and $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$,
(e) if $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$,
(f) $\left(\forall R_{?} \cdot \top\right) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$,
(g) $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ iff $S_{1}=S_{2}$ and there is some $x$ with $\langle x, y\rangle \in$ $\mathcal{E}_{S_{1}}$ and $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$,
(h) $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{3}, w S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ with $|w| \geq 1$ iff there is some $x$ with $\langle x, y\rangle \in$ $\mathcal{E}_{S_{2}},\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, and $S_{3}=\operatorname{con}\left(S_{1}, S_{2}\right)$.

Lemma $1(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is satisfiable iff there exists a tableau $\mathcal{T}$ for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$.
Proof 2 " $\Leftarrow$ " If $\mathcal{T}=\left(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\right)$ is a tableau for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$, a tree skeleton model $\mathcal{I}=\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)$ of $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ can be constructed as follows:

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}={ }_{\text {def }} \mathcal{N}$,
- $C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}={ }_{\text {def }}\left\{x \mid C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)\right\}$ for all $C_{1} \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}} \cap \operatorname{sub}(C)$,
- $C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}=_{\text {def }} \emptyset$ for all other concept names $C_{1} \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}} \backslash \operatorname{sub}(C)$,
- $R^{\mathcal{I}}=_{\text {def }}\left\{\langle x, y\rangle \mid \mathbf{w}_{-} \operatorname{ancestor}(y, w)=x,\left(\forall S . C_{1}\right)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)\right\}$ for all role names $R \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R}(C))$,
- $R^{\mathcal{I}}=_{\text {def }} \emptyset$ for all other roles $R \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}} \backslash \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})$.

First of all, due to Proposition 1 we can safely interpret all unmentioned roles (those not in roles $(\mathfrak{R})$ ) and concept names (those not in sub $(C)$ ) with the empty set.

We show that all roles are interpreted as disjoint: assume the contrary. Then there must be some roles $R, S \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}, R \neq S$ with $R^{\mathcal{I}} \cap S^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$. Due to the definition of $.^{\mathcal{I}},\langle x, y\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}} \cap S^{\mathcal{I}}$ with $R \neq S$ iff $x=$ w_ancestor $(y, w),\left(\forall S_{1} . C_{1}\right)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ and $\left(\forall S_{2} . C_{2}\right)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$. Please note that $S_{1}, S_{2}, C_{1}, C_{2}$, etc. do not matter here - they are just used as place-holders. We will therefore write $(\forall \ldots)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y),(\forall \ldots)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$. Using induction on $w$ we show that for each node $y,(\forall \ldots)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ and $(\forall \ldots)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ implies $R=S$. If $|w|=1$, this is an immediate consequence of Condition 2 g and of the fact that $y$ has only one predecessor, since we have a tree. For the induction step, $(\forall \ldots)_{R, w T} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ and $(\forall \ldots)_{S, w T} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ iff there is some $x$ with $\left\langle x, y>\in \mathcal{E}_{T},(\forall \ldots)_{R^{\prime}, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)\right.$, $(\forall \ldots)_{S^{\prime}, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$. Due to the hypothesis, $R^{\prime}=S^{\prime}$. But then we have $R=\operatorname{con}\left(R^{\prime}, T\right), S=\operatorname{con}\left(R^{\prime}, T\right)$, and since the role box is admissible and therefore contains only deterministic role axioms it follows that $R=S$.
We show $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{R}$ : assume the contrary. Then there must be some role axiom $r a \in \mathfrak{R}$ that ist not satisfied by $\mathcal{I}$. This is the case iff there are some $x, y, z$ with $\langle x, y\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}},\langle y, z\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$, and either $\langle x, z\rangle \notin \mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I})$ (note that an admissible role box is complete, and therefore, $\langle x, z\rangle \notin \mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I})$ cannot occur in a model of a complete role box), or $\langle x, z\rangle \in T^{\mathcal{I}}$, but $T \neq$ $\operatorname{con}(r a)=\operatorname{con}(R, S)$. Due to the definition of $\cdot \mathcal{I},\langle x, y\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}},\langle y, z\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$, iff $x=$ w_ancestor $\left(y, w_{1}\right), y=$ w_ancestor $\left(z, w_{2}\right),(\forall \ldots)_{R, w_{1}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ and $(\forall \ldots)_{S, w_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(z)$. Let $w=w_{1} w_{2}$. Obviously, $x=w_{\text {_ancestor }}(z, w)$. In the first case, $\langle x, z\rangle \notin \mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I})$ iff $(\forall \ldots)_{T, w} \notin \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(z)$, for all $T \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}$. However, due to Property 2f, we have $\forall R_{\text {? }} . \top \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$. Since $x=$ w_ancestor $(z, w)$ and $\forall R_{?} . \top \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, an iterated exploitation of the Properties 2 g and 2 h shows that $\left(\forall R_{?} \cdot \top\right)_{T, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(z)$, for some $T \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})$. Contradiction. In the second case, $\langle x, z\rangle \in T^{\mathcal{I}}$ iff $(\forall \ldots)_{T, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(z)$. Again use induction over $|w|$ : if $|w|=2$ we have $w=R S$ and it is obviously the case that $T=\operatorname{con}(R, S)$, due to Properties 2 g and 2 h . If $|w| \geq 3$, let $w=w^{\prime} U=w_{1} w_{2}$. Now, $(\forall \ldots)_{T, w^{\prime} U} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(z)$ implies $(\forall \ldots)_{T^{\prime}, w^{\prime}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(y^{\prime}\right)$, with $\left\langle y^{\prime}, z\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{U}}, T=\operatorname{con}\left(T^{\prime}, U\right)$. We also have $(\forall \ldots)_{S, w^{\prime \prime} U} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(z)$,
where $w_{2}=w^{\prime \prime} U$, and $(\forall \ldots)_{V, w^{\prime \prime}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(y^{\prime}\right)$. Due to Property $2 \mathrm{~h}, S=$ $\operatorname{con}(V, U)$. Please observe that $w^{\prime}=w_{1} w^{\prime \prime}$ and therefore, due to the induction hypothesis, $T^{\prime}=\operatorname{con}(R, V)$. But now, due to the associativity of the role box $\operatorname{con}(\operatorname{con}(R, V), U)=\operatorname{con}(R, \operatorname{con}(V, U))$. Since $T^{\prime}=\operatorname{con}(R, V)$, $S=\operatorname{con}(V, U)$ this means $\operatorname{con}\left(T^{\prime}, U\right)=\operatorname{con}(R, S)$. Since we know that $T=\operatorname{con}\left(T^{\prime}, U\right)$ we have obtained a contradiction to our assumption, since also $T=\operatorname{con}(R, S)$. Summing up we have shown that $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{R}$.
In the following, we will show by structural induction on the concept $E$ that if $E \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then also $x \in E^{\mathcal{I}}$. Assuming this, from $C \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{0}\right)$ (due to Property 1 in Definition 10) it follows that $x_{0} \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $C^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$, we have $\mathcal{I} \models C$.
Let $E \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ with $E \in \operatorname{sub}(C)$ :

1. If $E$ is a concept name, then $x \in E^{\mathcal{I}}$ by definition (since $\left.E \in \operatorname{sub}(C)\right)$.
2. If $E=\neg C_{1}$, then $C_{1} \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}}$, because $C_{1} \in \operatorname{sub}(C)$ and $C$ is in NNF. Since $\neg C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, it holds that $C_{1} \notin \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, because assuming $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ yields to to the conclusion that $\mathcal{T}$ is not a tableau, due to Property 2a. Since $C_{1} \notin \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ we have $x \notin C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$, and therefore $x \in\left(\neg C_{1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$.
3. If $E=\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)$, then due to Property 2b in Definition 10 it holds that $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ and $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$. Therefore, from the induction hypothesis we have $x \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $x \in C_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Hence $x \in\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$.
4. If $E=\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)$, then due to Property 2c in Definition 10 it holds that $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ or $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$. Therefore, from the induction hypothesis we have $x \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ or $x \in C_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Hence $x \in\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$.
5. If $E=\left(\exists S . C_{1}\right)$, then there is some $y \in \mathcal{N}$ such that $\langle x, y\rangle \in \mathcal{\mathcal { E } _ { \mathcal { S } }}$ and $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$, due to Property 2d in Definition 10. By the induction hypothesis it holds that $y \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Due to Property 2 f , we have $\forall R_{?} . \top \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, and Property 2 g ensures $\left(\forall R_{?} . \top\right)_{S, S} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$. By the definition of $S^{\mathcal{I}}$ we finally have $\langle x, y\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$, since $x=$ w_ancestor $(y, S)$. We therefore have $x \in\left(\exists S . C_{1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$.
6. If $E=\left(\forall S . C_{1}\right)$, then we have to show that for every $y$ with $\langle x, y\rangle \in$ $S^{\mathcal{I}}$ it holds that $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$. Due to the induction hypothesis $C_{1} \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ implies $y \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$, and therefore $x \in\left(\forall S . C_{1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ if we can show this for all $y$ with $\langle x, y\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$. Due to the definition of $S^{\mathcal{I}},\langle x, y\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$ iff $\left(\forall S_{1} . C_{2}\right)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ and w_ancestor $(y, w)=x$. Since $\forall S . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ and w_ancestor $(y, w)=x$, we have $\left(\forall S . C_{1}\right)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$, for some role $R$, due to Properties 2 g and 2 h . We already observed (see above) that $\left(\forall S . C_{1}\right)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ and $\left(\forall S_{1} . C_{2}\right)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ implies $R=S$, since the role box is deterministic. Hence $\left(\forall S . C_{1}\right)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$, and finally $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ due to Property 2 e .

Summing up, we have shown that $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{R})$, and all roles are interpreted as disjoint.
$" \Rightarrow$ " If $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{R}), \mathcal{I}=\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, .^{\mathcal{I}}\right)$, then a tableau $\mathcal{T}=\left(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\right)$ for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ can be constructed. Since a tableau is required to be a (possibly infinite) tree, but a model may be an arbitrary graph, but not necessarily a tree skeleton model, we cannot simply assign $\mathcal{N}={ }_{\text {def }} \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$. Intuitively, the tableau is constructed by unraveling or traversing the model, collecting the required information. Please note that this also gives a method how to concert an arbitrary model into a tree skeleton model: first transform it into a tableau as shown subsequently, and then transform this tableau back into a tree skeleton model using the model construction in the " $\Leftarrow$ "-part of this proof, see above.

In the construction, each node $x \in \mathcal{N}$ in the tableau $\mathcal{T}$ corresponds to a path in $\mathcal{I}$. A path in $\mathcal{I}$ is inductively defined as follows:

- For some (but only one) $i_{0} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ with $i_{0} \in C^{\mathcal{I}},\left[i_{0}\right]$ is a path in $\mathcal{I}$.
- If $\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}\right]$ (possibly $p=\left[i_{0}\right]$ ) is a path in $\mathcal{I}$ and $i_{m} \in\left(\exists R . C_{1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$, $<i_{m}, i_{n}>\in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ with $i_{n} \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ for some $\exists R . C_{1} \in \operatorname{sub}(C)$, then $\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}, i_{n}\right]$ is also a path in $\mathcal{I}$.

Note that a path really defines "which way to go" through the model, and the notion of "path" is therefore well-defined. However, this would not be the case without assumed role disjointness. For example, consider a model of $(\exists R . \top) \sqcap(\exists S . \top)$ with $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=\left\{i_{0}, i_{1}\right\}, R^{\mathcal{I}}=\left\{\left\langle x_{0}, x_{1}\right\rangle\right\}$, $\left.S^{\mathcal{I}}=\left\{<x_{0}, x_{1}\right\rangle\right\}$. In this case, the path $\left[x_{0}, x_{1}\right]$ would be ambitious, since it is unclear whether it has been produced traversing $\left\langle x_{0}, x_{1}\right\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ or $\left\langle x_{0}, x_{1}\right\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$. But due to the assumed role disjointness, such ambitious situations can not appear. This can be shown easily using induction over the length of the paths.

Let $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{I})$ denote the set of paths (as defined above) in $\mathcal{I}$. We can now define $\mathcal{T}=\left(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\right)$ inductively on the length of paths (e.g., in a breadth-first way) as follows:

- $\mathcal{N}={ }_{\text {def }} \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{I})$,
- $\mathcal{E}={ }_{\text {def }}\{\langle p, q\rangle \mid p, q \in \mathcal{N}$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left.p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{n}\right] \text { (possibly } p=\left[i_{0}\right]\right), \\
& q=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{n}, i_{n+1}\right], \\
& \left.<i_{n}, i_{n+1}>\in \mathcal{U R}(\mathcal{I}, \text { roles }(\mathfrak{R}))\right\},
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\text { - } \begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}={ }_{\text {def }}\{(\langle p, q>, R) \mid & <p, q>\in \mathcal{E}, \\
& \left.p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{n}\right] \text { (possibly } p=\left[i_{0}\right]\right), \\
& q=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{n}, i_{n+1}\right] \\
& \left.<i_{n}, i_{n+1}>\in R^{\mathcal{I}}\right\},
\end{aligned}
$$

- For all $q \in \mathcal{N}, q=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{n}\right]$ :

$$
\begin{gathered}
\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(q)=\text { def }\left\{C_{1} \mid C_{1} \in \operatorname{sub}(C), i_{n} \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}\right\} \cup\left\{\forall R_{?} \cdot T\right\} \cup \\
\left\{\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S, w} \mid p=\text { w_ancestor }(q, w),\right. \\
\left.p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}\right] \text { (possibly } p=\left[i_{0}\right]\right), \\
q=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}, \ldots, i_{n}\right], \\
<i_{m}, i_{n}>\in S^{\mathcal{I}}, S \in \operatorname{roles}(\Re), \\
\left.\forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)\right\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

We have to prove that $\mathcal{T}$ is a tableau for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ by showing that the tableau conditions are satisfied.

First of all, $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{E})$ is indeed a possibly infinite tree.

- Condition 1 (there is some node $x_{0} \in \mathcal{N}$ with $C \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{0}\right)$ ) is satisfied for $x_{0}=\left[i_{0}\right]$, since $\left[i_{0}\right] \in \mathcal{N}, i_{0} \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$, and therefore, due to the definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, C \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\left[i_{0}\right]\right)$.
- Condition 2a (if $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then $\neg C_{1} \notin \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ ) is obviously satisfied: for all $p \in \mathcal{N}$ with $p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}\right], C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p), \neg C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$ iff $i_{m} \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $i_{m} \in\left(\neg C_{1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. However, then $\mathcal{I}$ would not be a model. Contradiction.
- Condition 2 b (if $C_{1} \sqcap C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ and $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ ) is obviously satisfied: let $p \in \mathcal{N}, p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}\right]$. Then, $C_{1} \sqcap C_{2} \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$ iff $i_{m} \in\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Due to the semantics, $i_{m} \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $i_{m} \in C_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$. However, then also $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$ and $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$.
- Condition 2c (if $C_{1} \sqcup C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ or $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ ) is obviously satisfied: let $p \in \mathcal{N}, p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}\right]$. Then, $C_{1} \sqcup C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$ iff $i_{m} \in\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Due to the semantics, either $i_{m} \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ or $i_{m} \in C_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$ (or both). However, then also $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$ or $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$.
- Condition 2d (if $\exists R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then there is some $y$ such that $\langle x, y\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{R}$ and $\left.C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)\right)$ is satisfied: let $p \in \mathcal{N}, p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}\right]$. Then, $\exists R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$ iff $i_{m} \in\left(\exists R . C_{1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Due to the semantics, there is some $i_{n} \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $\left\langle i_{m}, i_{n}\right\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$. Due to the definition of path in $\mathcal{I}$, there is some path $q \in \mathcal{N}$, with $q=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}, i_{n}\right]$. Since $\left.<i_{m}, i_{n}\right\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$, by the definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$ we have $\langle p, q\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}$ (resp. $\left(\left\langle p, q>, \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}\right) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\right)$. Obviously, $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(q)$ because $i_{n} \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$.
- Condition 2e (if $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, then $\left.C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)\right)$ is satisfied: due to the definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}},\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(q)$ iff $p=$
$\mathbf{w}^{\boldsymbol{z}}$ ancestor $(q, w), p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}\right]$ and $q=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}, \ldots, i_{n}\right],<i_{m}, i_{n}>\in$ $R^{\mathcal{I}}, \forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$. We have $\forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$ iff $i_{m} \in\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $<i_{m}, i_{n}>\in R^{\mathcal{I}}$, also $i_{n} \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$, and therefore, due to the definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(q)$.
- Condition $2 \mathrm{f}\left(\forall R_{?} \cdot \top \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)\right)$ is obviously satisfied.
- Condition $2 \mathrm{~g}\left(\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)\right.$ iff $S_{1}=S_{2}$ and there is some $x$ with $\langle x, y\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{S_{1}}$ and $\left.\forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)\right)$ is satisfied:
$" \Rightarrow$ " If $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(q)$, then, by the definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, p=$ w_ancestor $\left(q, S_{2}\right)$ and $\left\langle p, q>\in \mathcal{E}_{S_{2}}, p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}\right], q=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{m}, i_{n}\right]\right.$, $\left.<i_{m}, i_{n}\right\rangle \in S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}, \forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$. Since $\left\langle p, q>\in \mathcal{E}\right.$ and $\left\langle i_{m}, i_{n}\right\rangle \in$ $S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ we have $\langle p, q\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{S_{1}}$, and therefore, $p=$ w_ancestor $\left(q, S_{1}\right)$. Since $\mathcal{T}$ is a tree we have $S_{1}=S_{2}$.
" $\Leftarrow$ " If $S_{1}=S_{2},\langle p, q\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{S_{1}}$ and $\forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$, then $\langle p, q\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{S_{1}}$ due to $\left\langle i_{m}, i_{n}>\in S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}\right.$. By definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}$ we have $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, S_{2}} \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(q)$, and hence $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, S_{1}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(q)$ since $S_{1}=S_{2}$.
- Condition $2 \mathrm{~h}\left(\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{3}, w S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)\right.$ with $|w| \geq 1$ iff there is some $x$ with $\langle x, y\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{S_{2}},\left(\forall R \cdot C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, and $\left.S_{3}=\operatorname{con}\left(S_{1}, S_{2}\right)\right)$ is satisfied:
" $\Leftarrow$ " If there is some $p$ with $\left\langle p, q>\in \mathcal{E}_{S_{2}},\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)\right.$, and $S_{3}=\operatorname{con}\left(S_{1}, S_{2}\right)$, then it is obviously the case that $|w| \geq 1$. Additionally, because of $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$, there must be some $o=\mathrm{w} \_$ancestor $(p, w)$, with $o=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{l}\right], p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{l}, \ldots, i_{m}\right]$ such that $\left\langle i_{l}, i_{m}\right\rangle \in S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}, \forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(o)$. Since $\langle p, q\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{S_{2}}$ it holds that $q=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{l}, \ldots, i_{m}, i_{n}\right]$ with $<i_{m}, i_{n}>\in S_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Because $S_{3}=\operatorname{con}\left(S_{1}, S_{2}\right)$ and $\mathcal{I} \models \Re$ we also have $<i_{l}, i_{n}>\in S_{3}^{\mathcal{I}}$, due to $S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ S_{2}^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq S_{3}^{\mathcal{I}}$. But then, by the definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}$ we must also have $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{3}, w S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(q)$, since $o=\mathrm{w}_{-} \operatorname{ancestor}\left(p, w S_{2}\right)$ and $\forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(o)$.
" $\Rightarrow$ " If $\left(\forall R \cdot C_{1}\right)_{S_{3}, w S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(r)$, and $|w| \geq 1$, then, by definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, p=$ w_ancestor $\left(r, w S_{2}\right), p=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{l}\right], r=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{l}, \ldots, i_{m}, i_{n}\right]$, $\left\langle i_{l}, i_{n}\right\rangle \in S_{3}^{\mathcal{I}}, \forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$. Obviously, there must also be some $q=\left[i_{0}, \ldots, i_{l}, \ldots, i_{m}\right]$, and therefore, $\left\langle i_{l}, i_{m}\right\rangle \in S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$, for some $S_{1}$. Since we know that $\langle p, q\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{S_{2}}$ it must be the case that $<i_{m}, i_{n}>\in S_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{R}$ and $\mathfrak{R}$ is a complete role box, and $\left\langle i_{l}, i_{n}\right\rangle \in S_{3}^{\mathcal{I}}$, it holds that $S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ S_{2}^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq S_{3}^{\mathcal{I}}$, which is enforced by $S_{3}=\operatorname{con}\left(S_{1}, S_{2}\right)$. Because $<i_{l}, i_{m}>\in S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}, \forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(p)$ and $p=\mathrm{w}$ _ancestor $(q, w)$, we have $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(q)$ by the definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}$.

Summing up we have shown that $\mathcal{T}$ is a tableau for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$.

## $\sqcap$-rule:

if 1. $C_{1} \sqcap C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)$
2. $\left\{C_{1}, C_{2}\right\} \nsubseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)$
then

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right):= & \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right) \cup \\
& \left\{C_{1}, C_{2}\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

$\sqcup$-rule:
if

1. $C_{1} \sqcup C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)$
$\exists \forall$-rule:

$$
\text { if 1. } \exists R \cdot C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)
$$

2. neither the $\sqcap$ - nor the $\sqcup$ - nor the $\forall$-rule is applicable to $x_{i}$
3. $\neg \exists<x_{i}, x_{j}>\in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}: C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{j}\right)$
4. $x_{i}$ is not blocked

## then

2. $\left\{C_{1}, C_{2}\right\} \cap \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)=\emptyset$
then
create a new node $x_{j}$ with
$\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right):=\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right) \cup\{D\}$
for some $D \in\left\{C_{1}, C_{2}\right\}$
$\forall$-rule:
if 1. $(\forall R . D)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)$ 2. $D \notin \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)$
$\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\left(\left\langle x_{i}, x_{j}\right\rangle\right):=R$,
$\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{j}\right):=\left\{C_{1}, \forall R_{?} . \top\right\} \cup$ $\left\{(\forall T . D)_{R, R} \mid\right.$
$\left.\forall T . D \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)\right\} \cup$ $\left\{(\forall T . D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, R), w R} \mid\right.$
then
$\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right):=\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right) \cup\{D\}$
Figure 1: The tableaux expansion rules

### 4.2 The Calculus

We are now ready to discuss the algorithm, which works on so-called completion trees:

Definition 11 (Completion Tree) A completion tree $\mathcal{C T}$ for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is a finite concept tree. A completion tree is said to contain a clash iff there is some node $x$ with $\{C, \neg C\} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ for some $C \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}}$. A node $y \in \mathcal{N}$ is said to be blocked iff there is an ancestor node $x$ of $y$ with with $x \equiv y$. In this case, we say $y$ is blocked by $x$. The relation $\equiv$ is defined as follows: $x \equiv y$ iff $\forall c_{x}:\left(c_{x} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x) \Rightarrow\right.$ $\left.\exists c_{y} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y): c_{x} \equiv c_{y}\right) \wedge \forall c_{y}:\left(c_{y} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y) \Rightarrow \exists c_{x} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x): c_{x} \equiv c_{y}\right)$, where $c_{x} \equiv c_{y}$ iff $c_{x}=(\forall R . C)_{S, w} \wedge c_{y}=(\forall R . C)_{S, v} \vee c_{x}=c_{y} .{ }^{7}$

The tableaux algorithm works as follows: in order to decide the satisfiability of $(C, \mathfrak{R})$, the algorithm starts with the initial completion tree

$$
\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{0}=\left(\left\{x_{0}\right\},\left\{\left(x_{0},\left\{C, \forall R_{?} \cdot \top\right\}\right)\right\}, \emptyset, \emptyset\right)
$$

and exhaustively applies the non-deterministic tableaux expansion rules (see Figure 1) until either the completion tree contains a clash or none of the rules is

[^5]applicable anymore, i.e. the tree is complete.
The rules either expand the tree by generating new successor nodes due to the presence of $\exists$-constraints, or expand the label of some node $x$ by adding constraints to it, according to the decomposition into subconcepts. If the completion rules can be applied in such a way that they construct a complete and clash-free completion tree, $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is satisfiable, otherwise $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is unsatisfiable. Due to the non-determinism this is the case if all possible computations yield a completion tree containing a clash. The algorithm therefore behaves like a non-deterministic Turing machine: SAT returns TRUE iff there is some successful computation. More formally, SAT can be specified as follows (note that apply_rule is a non-deterministic procedure):
\[

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{SAT}(C, \mathfrak{R})={ }_{\text {def }} \\
& \mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{0}:=\left(\left\{x_{0}\right\},\left\{\left(x_{0},\left\{C, \forall R_{?} . \top\right\}\right)\right\}, \emptyset, \emptyset\right) \\
& i:=0 \\
& \text { WHILE }\left(\neg \text { complete } ?\left(\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}\right) \wedge \neg \text { clash } ?\left(\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}\right)\right) \\
& \text { DO } \\
& \quad \mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i+1}:=\text { apply_rule }\left(\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}\right) \\
& \quad i:=i+1 \\
& \text { OD } \\
& \text { RETURN } \neg \text { clash? }\left(\mathcal{C T} \mathcal{T}_{i}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$
\]

A blocking mechanism is needed to ensure the termination of the tableaux algorithm, e.g. for $((\exists R . C) \sqcap(\forall R . \exists R . C),\{R \circ R \sqsubseteq R\})$. Note that this concept is also expressible in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$, since $R$ is declared as a transitively closed role. Unlike for $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$, an infinite model (tableau) must be constructed if blocking occurred. This is due to the fact that $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ does not have the finite model property (see example above).

### 4.3 Formal Properties of the Calculus

In the following we will prove that the algorithm always terminates, and that it is sound and complete - the algorithm is therefore a decision procedure. Additionally, we prove EXPTIME-completeness of $(C, \mathfrak{R})$-satisfiability in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$.

### 4.3.1 Termination

Lemma 2 (Termination) For each pair $(C, \mathfrak{R})$, where $C$ is an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ concept and $\mathfrak{R}$ is a role box that is admissible for $C, \operatorname{SAT}((C, \mathfrak{R}))$ terminates.

Proof 3 We have to show that there is no infinite sequence of rule applications. To obtain an infinite sequence of rule applications, at least one rule must be applied infinitely often, since we have a finite number of rules. We show that no rule can be applied infinitely often.
Inspecting the tableaux expansion rules, it is obviously the case that for any node $x$ in the tree, each rule can be applied at most once. This is due to the fact that the applicability of each rule is appropriately "guarded" by a precondition. For example, the $\Pi$-rule can only be applied to a node $x$ if one of the conjuncts it is going to add is missing in the label $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ of the node $x$. Additionally one has to observe that none of the rules ever removes elements from $\mathcal{L}(x)$ what could re-trigger the applicability of the rules $\sqcap, \sqcup$ and $\forall$. Also, none of the rules ever removes already created (successor) nodes, what could re-trigger the applicability of the $\exists \forall$-rule.

Then, in order to obtain an infinite number of rule applications, the algorithm must create an infinite number of nodes and therefore an infinite completion tree. Exploiting the fact that new nodes are only generated by the $\exists \forall$-rule it is obvious that we have a finitely branching tree whose branching factor is bounded by $|\operatorname{sub}(C)|$, since there cannot be more than $|\operatorname{sub}(C)|$ concepts of the form $\exists R . C$ in the label of each node. Then, due to König's Lemma, in order to obtain an infinite tree, there must be an infinite path, since the tree is finitely branching. We show that there is no infinite path:
With respect to blocking, it suffices to view the nodes as if they were annotated with labels from

$$
\mathcal{Q}=\operatorname{sub}(C) \cup\left\{\forall R_{?} . T\right\} \cup\left\{\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S} \mid \forall R . C_{1} \in \operatorname{sub}(C), S \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})\right\},
$$

since $\left(\forall R \cdot C_{1}\right)_{S, w} \equiv\left(\forall R \cdot C_{1}\right)_{S, v}$, even if $w \neq v$. Obviously, there are at most $n=2^{|\mathcal{Q}|}$ different node labels. In terms of complexity, if $x=|C|$ and $y=|\mathfrak{R}|$, please note that $|\operatorname{sub}(C)|$ is bound by $x$ and $|\operatorname{roles}(\Re)|$ is bound by $\sqrt{\frac{y}{3}}$ (e.g. a minimal representation of a composition table would be set of triples; note that the composition table is complete). Then, $n \leq\left(2^{x+x * \sqrt{\frac{y}{3}}}\right) \leq 2^{c x}$ for an appropriate $c$. Considering the size of the input $z=x+y$ as input parameter ("combined complexity"), $n \leq\left(2^{x+x * \sqrt{y}}\right) \leq 2^{z^{2}}$. Any path of a length greater than $n$ must therefore contain two nodes $x, y$ with $x \equiv y$, and blocking occurs (Pigeonhole Principle). Since no rule is applicable to a blocked node, there can be no infinite path(s). Summing up we have shown that SAT always terminates.

### 4.3.2 Soundness

We will prove soundness by showing how to construct a tableau from a complete and clash-free completion tree that has been derived by SAT. In some cases, if
blocking occurred during the construction of the completion tree, the constructed tableau will be infinite. Again, an unraveling technique is used for this purpose.

Lemma 3 (Soundness) Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ concept, and $\mathfrak{R}$ be an admissible role box for $C$. If there is a computation such that $\operatorname{SAT}((C, \mathfrak{R}))$ returns TRUE, then $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ has a tableau.

Proof 4 Intuitively, the definition of a tableau $\mathcal{T}=\left(\mathcal{N}^{\prime}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}, \mathcal{E}^{\prime}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\prime}\right)$ from the complete and clash-free completion tree $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}=\left(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\right)$ that has been constructed by a successful computation of SAT works as follows (the following explanation is borrowed from Horrocks, Sattler et. al in [7, 8]): An individual in $\mathcal{N}^{\prime}$ corresponds to a path in the completion tree from the root node to some node that is not blocked. To obtain infinite tableaus, these paths may by cyclic. Instead of going to a blocked node, these paths go "back" to the blocking node, and this for an arbitrary number of times. Thus, if blocking occurred while constructing a tableau, we obtain an infinite tableau. Let $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}=\left(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\right)$ be the complete and clash-free completion tree.
Paths in $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}$ are defined inductively as follows (we simply write $\mathcal{C T}$ in the following):

1. For the root node $x_{0} \in \mathcal{N},\left[x_{0}\right]$ is a path in $\mathcal{C T}$.
2. For a path $\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n}\right]$ and a node $x_{i} \in \mathcal{N},\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n}, x_{i}\right]$ is a path in $\mathcal{C T}$ iff
(a) $\left\langle x_{n}, x_{i}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}$, and $x_{i}$ is not blocked, or
(b) $<x_{n}, x_{n+1}>\in \mathcal{E}$, and $x_{n+1}$ is blocked by $x_{i}\left(x_{i} \equiv x_{n+1}\right)$.

Whenever we write $\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n}\right]$, we also include the possibility that $\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n}\right]=$ $\left[x_{0}\right]$; and $\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n}, x_{n+1}\right]$ includes the possibility that $\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n}, x_{n+1}\right]=\left[x_{0}, x_{1}\right]$.
First of all, a path is a finite object. Additionally, a path $p=\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{p t}\right]$ contains no blocked nodes, but may contain nodes that act as blocking nodes for nodes that are blocked in the completion tree. A path may contain more that one node acting as a blocking node (for different blocked nodes).
As already noted, an individual path $_{q} \in \mathcal{N}^{\prime}$ corresponds to a path $q$. Given a path $q$ we denote the last individual from $\mathcal{N}$ lying on this path with $x_{q t}$ (for $q^{\prime} s$ tail): $q=\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{q t}\right]$. The corresponding individual from $\mathcal{N}^{\prime}$ is path $h_{q}=$ $\operatorname{path}_{\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{q}\right]}$. The tableau $\mathcal{T}=\left(\mathcal{N}^{\prime}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}, \mathcal{E}^{\prime}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\prime}\right)$ for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is defined as follows:

- $\mathcal{N}^{\prime}=_{\text {def }}\left\{\right.$ path $_{p} \mid p$ is a path in $\left.\mathcal{C T}\right\}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { - } \mathcal{E}^{\prime}={ }_{\text {def }}\left\{<\text { path }_{p}, \text { path }_{q}>\mid p=\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{p t}\right]\right. \text {, } \\
& q=\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{p t}, x_{q t}\right], \\
& <x_{p t}, x_{q t}>\in \mathcal{E}, x_{q t} \text { is not blocked, or } \\
& \left.<x_{p t}, x_{i}>\in \mathcal{E}, x_{i} \text { is blocked by } x_{q t}\left(x_{q t} \equiv x_{i}\right)\right\} \\
& \text { - } \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\prime}={ }_{\text {def }}\left\{\left(\left\langle\text { path }_{p}, \text { path }_{q}\right\rangle, R\right) \mid p=\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{p t}\right]\right. \text {, } \\
& q=\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{p t}, x_{q t}\right], \\
& \left\langle x_{p t}, x_{q t}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}, x_{q t} \text { is not blocked, or } \\
& \left.\left\langle x_{p t}, x_{i}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{R}, x_{i} \text { is blocked by } x_{q t}\left(x_{q t} \equiv x_{i}\right)\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

For all path $\mathcal{N}^{\prime} \in \mathcal{N}^{\prime}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{q}\right)$ is defined inductively on the length of the denoted paths, starting with path ${ }_{\left[x_{0}\right]}$ (e.g. by using a breadth-first traversation).

- $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{\left[x_{0}\right]}\right)=_{\text {def }} \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{0}\right)$

If $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{p}\right)$ with $p=\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{p t}\right]$ is already defined, and $\left\langle\right.$ path $h_{p}$, path $\left.h_{q}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}^{\prime}$ for some role $R$, we then define $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{q}\right)$ for $q=\left[x_{0}, \ldots, x_{p t}, x_{q t}\right]$ as follows:

$$
\text { - } \begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\text { path }_{q}\right)=\operatorname{def}_{\text {def }} & \left\{\forall R_{?} \cdot T\right\} \cup \\
& \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{q t}\right) \cap \operatorname{sub}(C) \cup \\
& \left\{(\forall T . D)_{R, R} \mid \forall T . D \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{p t}\right)\right\} \cup \\
& \left\{(\forall T . D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, R), w R} \mid(\forall T . D)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\text { path }_{p}\right)\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Lemma 4 Let $\mathcal{C T}=\left(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\right)$ be the clash-free and complete completion tree constructed by SAT, and let $\mathcal{T}=\left(\mathcal{N}^{\prime}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}, \mathcal{E}^{\prime}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\prime}\right)$ be defined as above. Then, for all path $h_{p} \in \mathcal{N}^{\prime}:$ path $_{p} \equiv x_{p t}$.

Proof 5 This can be easily shown using induction, starting with path ${ }_{\left[x_{0}\right]}$. The key-observation is that an admissible role box must be deterministic.

Now it can be shown that $\mathcal{T}=\left(\mathcal{N}^{\prime}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}, \mathcal{E}^{\prime}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\prime}\right)$ is a tableau for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$.

1. First of all, the tableau is a possibly infinite concept tree.
2. Condition 1 is satisfied, since $C \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{0}\right)$ for the root node $x_{0}$ of the completion tree $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}$. Since the root node cannot be blocked there is an individual path ${ }_{\left[x_{0}\right]} \in \mathcal{N}^{\prime}$. Due to Lemma $4, C \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{\left[x_{0}\right]}\right)$.
3. Condition 2 f is satisfied. $\forall R_{\text {? }} \cdot T \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{0}\right)$ since the SAT algorithm started with $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{0}=\left(\left\{x_{0}\right\},\left\{\left(x_{0},\left\{C, \forall R_{?}.\right\} \top\right\}\right), \emptyset, \emptyset\right)$, and for the other nodes, $\forall R_{?} . \top \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)$ due to the $\exists \forall$-rule. Due to Lemma $4, \forall R$ ? $\cdot \top \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{p}\right)$ for all path $_{p} \in \mathcal{N}^{\prime}$.
4. Due to Lemma 4, Conditions 2a, 2b, 2c and 2e are trivially satisfied, since path $_{p} \equiv x_{p t}$, and $x_{p t} \in \mathcal{N}$ is a node in a clash-free and complete completion tree. For example, consider Property 2b: if $C_{1} \sqcap C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{p}\right)$, then $C_{1} \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{p}\right), C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{p}\right)$. Because the completion tree is complete, the $\Pi$-rule is not applicable to $x_{p t}$. This shows that $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{p t}\right)$ and $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{p t}\right)$. Since path $\equiv x_{p t}$ the same holds for $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{p}\right)$.
5. Condition 2 d (if $\exists R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{p}\right)$, then there is some path ${ }_{q} \in \mathcal{N}^{\prime}$ such that $\left\langle\right.$ path $_{p}$, path $\left._{q}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}^{\prime}$ and $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left.\left._{q}\right)\right)$ is satisfied. Since $\exists R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(p a t h_{p}\right)$, it must be the case that $\exists R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{p t}\right)$. Note that $x_{p t}$ is not blocked, by the definition of "path in $\mathcal{C T}$ ". Therefore, the $\exists \forall$ rule has created an $R$ successor $x_{i}$, with $\left\langle x_{p t}, x_{i}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}$ and $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)$. There are two possibilities:
(a) $x_{i}$ is not blocked. In this case, due to the definition of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}^{\prime}$, we have $x_{q t}=x_{i}$, and $\left\langle\right.$ path $_{p}$, path $\left._{q}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}^{\prime}$. Therefore, $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{q}\right)$, since $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{q t}\right)$.
(b) $x_{i}$ is blocked. In this case, instead of going to the $R$ successor $x_{i}$ in the completion tree, the path $q$ is obtained from $p$ by "going back" to the blocking node $x_{q t}, x_{q t} \equiv x_{i}$. However, by the definition of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}^{\prime}$, we have again $\left\langle\right.$ path, path $\gg \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}^{\prime}$. By definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}$ and the blocking condition it holds that $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{q}\right)$, since $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{q t}\right)$.
6. Condition 2 g (if $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{q}\right)$ iff $S_{1}=S_{2}$ and there is some path $_{p}$ with $\left\langle\right.$ path $_{p}$, path $\left._{q}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}^{\prime}{ }_{S 1}$ and $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left.\left._{p}\right)\right)$ is satisfied:
$" \Rightarrow "$ If $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{q}\right)$, then by definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime},\left\langle\right.$ path $_{p}$, path $\left._{q}\right\rangle \in$ $\mathcal{E}^{\prime}{ }_{S_{1}}, S_{1}=S_{2}$ and $\forall R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{p t}\right)$. Because of path $h_{p} \equiv x_{p t}$ we also have $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{p}\right)$.
" $\Leftarrow$ " If there is some path $h_{p}$ with $<$ path $_{p}$, path $_{q}>\in \mathcal{E}^{\prime}{ }_{S_{1}}$ and $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right) \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{p}\right)$, and $S_{1}=S_{2}$, then also $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{q}\right)$, because $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{p t}\right)$, and by definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}$ we have $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, S_{1}} \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{q}\right)$.
7. Condition 2h (if $\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{3}, w S_{2}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left._{q}\right)$ with $|w| \geq 1$ iff there is some path $p$ with $\left\langle\right.$ path $_{p}$, path $\left._{q}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{S 2}^{\prime},\left(\forall R . C_{1}\right)_{S_{1}, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(\right.$ path $\left.h_{p}\right)$, and $\left.S_{3}=\operatorname{con}\left(S_{1}, S_{2}\right)\right)$ is satisfied by definition of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}$, which is obvious.

### 4.3.3 Completeness

We show how to construct a complete and clash-free completion tree $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}$ from a given tableau $\mathcal{T}$. Intuitively, instead of doing a "blind search", the application
of the tableau rules is now guided by the information in the tableau $\mathcal{T}$. For example, when the $\sqcup$-rule is to be applied to a node $x$ in the completion tree $\mathcal{C T}$ and has the choice whether to add, for example, $C_{1}$ or $C_{2}$ to the label of this node, the node label of the corresponding node in the tableau $\mathcal{T}$ is used to decide whether $C_{1}$ or $C_{2}$ should be added. Note that we cannot make wrong decisions, since otherwise $\mathcal{T}$ would not be a tableau. However, the question is how to find the corresponding node in $\mathcal{T}$ containing the required information.
For this purpose, a mapping function $\pi: \mathcal{N}^{\prime} \rightarrow \mathcal{N}$ is used to associate nodes in the completion tree $\left(\mathcal{N}^{\prime}\right)$ with nodes in the tableau $(\mathcal{N})$. Now, the non-deterministic $\sqcup$-rule is always applied in a way such that for all $x^{\prime} \in \mathcal{N}^{\prime}$ : $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$ (note that $\left.x=\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right), x \in \mathcal{N}\right)$. To achieve this, the $\sqcup$-rule is replaced by the $\sqcup^{\prime}$-rule, which "looks up" the required information using $\pi . \pi$ is constructed incrementally by the modified $\exists \forall^{\prime}$ rule, which replaces the $\exists \forall$-rule. These modified rules are shown in Figure 2. Using this technique, we can show completeness of the calculus (resp. of the procedure SAT):
$\sqcup^{\prime}$-rule:
if 1. $C_{1} \sqcup C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x_{i}^{\prime}\right)$
2. $\left\{C_{1}, C_{2}\right\} \cap \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x_{i}^{\prime}\right)=\emptyset$
then $\quad \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x_{i}^{\prime}\right):=\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x_{i}^{\prime}\right) \cup\{D\}$ for some $D \in\left\{C_{1}, C_{2}\right\} \cap \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x_{i}^{\prime}\right)\right)$

## $\exists \forall^{\prime}$-rule:

if 1. $\exists R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x_{i}^{\prime}\right)$
2. neither the $\sqcap$ - nor the $\sqcup^{\prime}$ - nor the

$$
\forall \text {-rule is applicable to } x_{i}^{\prime}
$$

3. $\neg \exists\left\langle x_{i}^{\prime}, x_{j}^{\prime}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}^{\prime}: C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x_{j}^{\prime}\right)$
4. $x_{i}^{\prime}$ is not blocked
then create a new node $x_{j}^{\prime}$ with

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \pi\left(x_{j}^{\prime}\right)={ }_{\text {def }} x_{j} \text { for } \\
& \text { some }<\pi\left(x_{i}^{\prime}\right), x_{j}>\in \mathcal{E}_{R} \text { with } C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{j}\right) \text { and let } \\
& \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\prime}\left(<x_{i}^{\prime}, x_{j}^{\prime}>\right):=R, \\
& \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x_{j}^{\prime}\right):=\left\{C_{1}, \forall R_{?} \cdot \top\right\} \cup \\
& \quad\left\{(\forall T . D)_{R, R} \mid\right. \\
& \left.\quad \forall T . D \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x_{i}^{\prime}\right)\right\} \cup \\
& \quad\left\{(\forall T . D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, R), w R} \mid\right. \\
& \left.\quad(\forall T . D)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x_{i}^{\prime}\right)\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Figure 2: The modified tableau expansion rules for $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$

Lemma 5 (Completeness) Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ concept, and $\mathfrak{R}$ be an admissible role box for $C$, and let $\mathcal{T}$ be a tableau for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$. Then, $\operatorname{SAT}(C, \mathfrak{R})$
returns TRUE - there is a successful computation yielding a complete and clashfree completion tree $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}$.

Proof 6 If there is a successful computation $\operatorname{SAT}(C, \mathfrak{R})$, then the tableaux expansion rules can be applied in such a way to

$$
\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{0}=\left(\left\{x_{0}\right\},\left\{\left(x_{0},\left\{C, \forall R_{?} \cdot \top\right\}\right)\right\}, \emptyset, \emptyset\right)
$$

that a complete and clash-free completion tree $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}$ is created. We show how to construct $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}$ using the information in the tableaux $\mathcal{T}=\left(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\right)$. We will use the modified tableaux expansion rules $\left\{\square, \sqcup^{\prime}, \forall, \exists \forall^{\prime}\right\}$. It is easy to see that, if the completion tree $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}$ was generated using the modified expansion rules, then $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}$ could have also been constructed using the (original) expansion rules in the first place. A successful computation of SAT using the modified expansion rules implies the existence of a successful computation of SAT using the original expansion rules, therefore proving the Lemma.
We still need to argue formally that the completion tree that has been constructed with the modified expansion rules is clash free. Obviously, the tableau is "clash-free" - there is no node $x$ with $C_{1}, \neg C_{1} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$ for some $C_{1} \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}}$. We therefore show $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$ for all nodes $x^{\prime} \in \mathcal{N}^{\prime}$, using induction over the sequence of completion trees that is generated during the construction of $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{i}$ and $\pi$ :

- We start with $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}_{0}=\left(\left\{x_{0}^{\prime}\right\},\left\{\left(x_{0}^{\prime},\left\{C, \forall R_{?} \cdot \top\right\}\right)\right\}, \emptyset, \emptyset\right)$ and $\pi\left(x_{0}^{\prime}\right)={ }_{\text {def }} x_{0}$. Note that $x_{0} \in \mathcal{N}$ is the root node of the tableau. Due to Tableaux Condition 2 f we have $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$.
- For the induction step, let $\mathcal{C \mathcal { T } ^ { \prime }}$ be the completion tree that has been generated by the application of some rule to $\mathcal{C T}$. According to the different rules, we can distinguish four cases:
- If $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ has is derived from $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}$ by an application of the $\Pi$-rule to some node $x^{\prime} \in \mathcal{N}^{\prime}$ with $C_{1} \sqcap C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right)$, then both $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ are added to $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right)$, yielding $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}^{\prime}$. Due to the induction hypothesis $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$ holds for $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}$. But since $\mathcal{T}$ is a tableau we already have $\left\{C_{1}, C_{2}\right\} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$ and therefore still $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$ after the rule application.
- If the $\sqcup^{\prime}$-rule can be applied to $x^{\prime}$ in $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}$ with $C_{1} \sqcup C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right)$, then also $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$ or $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$ due to the induction hypothesis. In the former case, the $\sqcup^{\prime}$-rule adds $C_{1}$ (and not $C_{2}$ ), and in latter it adds $C_{2}$ (and not $C_{1}$ ) to $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}$. Since the "correct" disjunct is added, we have $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$ in $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}^{\prime}$.
- If the $\forall$-rule can be applied to $x^{\prime}$ in $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}$, then $(\forall R . C)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right)$. Due to the induction hypothesis we also have $(\forall R . C)_{R, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$, and since $\mathcal{T}$ is a tableau, $C \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$. $C$ is added by the $\forall$-rule to $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right)$. Therefore, we still have $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$.
- Assume the $\exists \forall^{\prime}$-rule can be applied to $x^{\prime}$ in $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{T}$ due to $\exists R . C_{1} \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right)$. Due to the induction hypothesis we also have $\exists R . C_{1} \in$ $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$ and therefore, there is some node $y \in \mathcal{N}$ with $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$ and $<\pi\left(x^{\prime}\right), y>\in \mathcal{E}_{R}$, due to tableaux Condition 2 d . The $\exists \forall^{\prime}$-rule does not change the label of $x^{\prime}$, but creates a new node $y^{\prime}$ with $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(y^{\prime}\right):=\left\{C_{1}, \forall R_{?} . T\right\} \cup\left\{(\forall T . D)_{R, R} \mid \forall T . D \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right\} \cup$
$\left\{(\forall T . D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, R), w R} \mid(\forall T . D)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right\}$ and assigns $\pi\left(y^{\prime}\right)==_{\text {def }} y$ for some appropriate $y$. Due to the induction hypothesis, $\left\{(\forall T . D)_{S, w} \mid(\forall T . D)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right\} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$, $\left\{\forall T . D \mid \forall T . D \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}(x)\right\} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(x)$. According to the tableaux Conditions $2 \mathrm{e}, 2 \mathrm{~d}, 2 \mathrm{~g}$ and 2 h , not only $\left\{C_{1}, \forall R_{?} . \top\right\} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}(y)$, but also $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(y^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(\pi\left(y^{\prime}\right)\right)$. This is ensured by the fact that the role box and therefore the $\exists \forall^{\prime}$-rule is deterministic; i.e. $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(y^{\prime}\right)$ is solely determined by $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\prime}\left(x^{\prime}\right)$, and this holds for $\mathcal{T}$ as well.

The following theorem summarizes Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and Lemma 5:
Theorem 1 SAT is a decision procedure for $(C, \mathfrak{R})$-satisfiability in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ (provided $C$ is an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ concept and $\mathfrak{R}$ is an admissible role box for $C$ ).

### 4.3.4 Computational Complexity

In the following, we consider the computational complexity of ( $C, \mathfrak{R}$ )-satisfiability in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$.

Theorem $2(C, \mathfrak{R})$-satisfiability in $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$ is EXPTIME-complete.
Proof 7 Lower Complexity Bound: EXPTIME-hardness It is well-known that satisfiability of $\mathcal{A L C}$ concepts w.r.t. general TBoxes containing GCIs (see above) is EXPTIME-complete (see [13]).
Using a technique called internalization (see [1], [6]), we can easily show EXPTIME-hardness of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$.
Internalization for $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ works as follows: given an arbitrary $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$ concept $C$ and a general TBox $\mathfrak{T}$, we fix some role $S \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}$ that does neither appear in $C$ nor in $\mathfrak{T}\left(S \notin \operatorname{roles}(C) \cup \bigcup_{D \sqsubseteq E \in \mathfrak{T}}(\operatorname{roles}(D) \cup\right.$ roles $\left.(E))\right)$. Let $C^{\prime}=_{\text {def }} C \sqcap M_{\mathfrak{I}} \sqcap \forall\left(\sqcup_{R \in \operatorname{roles}(C \cup\{S\})} R\right) . M_{\mathfrak{T}}, M_{\mathfrak{T}}==_{\text {def }} \sqcap_{D \sqsubseteq E \in \mathfrak{T}} \neg D \sqcup E$ and $\mathfrak{R}=_{\text {def }}\left\{R_{1} \circ R_{2} \sqsubseteq S \mid R_{1}, R_{2} \in \operatorname{roles}\left(C^{\prime}\right)\right\}$. Please note that $S$ is the
fixed role. The concept $M_{\mathfrak{T}}$ is the so-called meta-constraint corresponding to the TBox $\mathfrak{T}$, and $\mathfrak{R}$ is obviously an admissible role box for $C^{\prime}$.

We show the following: the $\mathcal{A L C}$ concept $C$ is satisfiable w.r.t. the TBox $\mathfrak{T}$ iff $C^{\prime}$ is satisfiable w.r.t. the role box $\mathfrak{R}$.
$" \Rightarrow$ " If $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{T})$, then we construct $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$ such that $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models\left(C^{\prime}, \mathfrak{R}\right)$. Without loss of generality we may assume that $\mathcal{I}$ has the form of a (possibly) infinite tree. ${ }^{8}$ If $\mathcal{I}=\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)$, we then define $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}=\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}, . \mathcal{I}^{\prime}\right)$ with $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}={ }_{\text {def }} \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, and for all concept names $D \in \operatorname{sub}(C), D^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}={ }_{\text {def }} D^{\mathcal{I}}$, and all role names $R \in \operatorname{roles}(C), R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}={ }_{\text {def }} R^{\mathcal{I}}$. Additionally, we set $S^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}={ }_{\text {def }}\left(\mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I}, \operatorname{roles}(C))^{+} \backslash \mathcal{S} \mathcal{K} \mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{I}\right.$, roles $\left.(C))\right)$. Due to $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{T}$, for each GCI $D \sqsubseteq E \in \mathfrak{T}$ : $D^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq E^{\mathcal{I}}$. Obviously, then also $x \in$ $((\neg D) \sqcup E)^{\mathcal{I}}$ for each $x \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ and every $D \sqsubseteq E \in \mathfrak{T}$, and therefore, $x \in M_{\mathfrak{T}}^{\mathcal{I}}$ for all $x \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$. If $x_{0} \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$, then also $x_{0} \in\left(C \sqcap M_{\mathfrak{T}}\right)^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$. Now, for each $x_{i} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ with $x_{0} \neq x_{i}$ either $\left\langle x_{0}, x_{i}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{U} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{I}$, roles $(C))$ and therefore, $\left\langle x_{0}, x_{i}\right\rangle \in \forall\left(\sqcup_{R \in \text { roles }(C)} R\right) . M_{\mathfrak{T}}^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$, or $\left\langle x_{0}, x_{i}\right\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$. Since $x_{i} \in M_{\mathfrak{T}}^{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}$, this shows that $x_{0} \in \forall\left(\sqcup_{R \in \text { roles }(C) \cup\{S\}} R\right) \cdot M_{\mathfrak{T}}^{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}$, and therefore, $x_{0} \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$. Due to the definition of $S^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$ and since our model has the form of a tree, $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models \Re$ and all roles are still interpreted as disjoint. This shows that $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models\left(C^{\prime}, \mathfrak{R}\right)$.
" $\Leftarrow$ " If $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models\left(C^{\prime}, \mathfrak{R}\right)$, then $\mathcal{I}$ can be constructed such that $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{T})$. Without loss of generality we may assume that $\operatorname{SKE} \mathcal{L}\left(\mathcal{I}^{\prime}\right.$, roles $\left.\left(C^{\prime}\right)\right)$ has the form of a possibly infinite tree $-\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$ is a tree skeleton model. We simply define $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}={ }_{\text {def }} \Delta^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}} \cap M_{\mathbb{T}}^{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}$ and for all concept names $D \in$ $\operatorname{sub}(C): D^{\mathcal{I}}={ }_{\text {def }} D^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$, and for all role names $R \in \operatorname{roles}(C): R^{\mathcal{I}}={ }_{\text {def }}$ $R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$. It is obvious that $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{T})$.

Upper Complexity Bound: Membership in EXPTIME We show that satisfiability of $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ can be reduced to satisfiability of $C$ in $\mathcal{A L C}$ w.r.t. a certain general TBox $\mathfrak{T}$. This TBox $\mathfrak{T}$ is extracted from $C$ and $\mathfrak{R}$. ( $C, \mathfrak{T}$ ) will be equi-satisfiable to $(C, \mathfrak{R})$, which is proven in the subsequent Lemma (see below). The basic idea of the TBox $\mathfrak{T}$ is to handle universal value restrictions $\forall R . C$ correctly by "propagating" annotated atomic marker concepts of the form $(\forall R . D)_{S}$ to successors individuals, simulating the propagation of $(\forall R . D)_{S, w}$-constraints as done by the $\exists \forall$ rule of the tableaux calculus. Therefore, also indirect $R$-successors will be elements of $D^{\mathcal{I}}$. The TBox $\mathfrak{T}$ (which will be cyclical in most cases) is defined as follows:

[^6]```
\mp@subsup{\mathfrak{T}}{0}{}}:={\forallR.D\sqsubseteq\forallR.D| \forallR.D\in\operatorname{sub}(C)}
        {\forallR.D\sqsubseteq\forall(\mp@subsup{\sqcup}{S\inroles(C)Uroles(\Re)}{}S).(\forallR.D\mp@subsup{)}{S}{}|}|R.D\in\operatorname{sub}(C)
\mp@subsup{\mathfrak{T}}{1}{}}:=\mp@subsup{\mathfrak{T}}{0}{}\cup{|(\forallR.D\mp@subsup{)}{R}{}\sqsubseteqD|(\forallR.D\mp@subsup{)}{R}{}\in\operatorname{sub}(\mp@subsup{\mathfrak{T}}{0}{})
i:=1
WHILE }\mp@subsup{\mathfrak{T}}{\mathfrak{i}}{}\not=\mp@subsup{\mathfrak{T}}{\mathfrak{i}-1}{
DO
    i:=i+1
    \mp@subsup{\mathfrak{T}}{\mathfrak{i}}{}:=\mp@subsup{\mathfrak{T}}{\mathfrak{i}-\mathbf{1}}{}\cup{(\forallR.D\mp@subsup{)}{S}{}\sqsubseteq
        \forall(\mp@subsup{\sqcup}{T\in\mathrm{ roles (C)Uroles ({)}}{}T).|(\forallR.D\mp@subsup{)}{\operatorname{con}(S,T)}{}||(\forallR.D\mp@subsup{)}{S}{}\in\operatorname{sub}(\mp@subsup{\mathfrak{T}}{\mathfrak{i}-1}{})}
    OD
```

It is obvious that the TBox $\mathfrak{T}$ can be computed in polynomial time and therefore, satisfiability of $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is clearly in EXPTIME, since satisfiability of $\mathcal{A L C}$ with general TBoxes is in EXPTIME.

A few words regarding the construction of $\mathfrak{T}$ seem to be appropriate: All concepts of the form $\ldots$ are concept names from $\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}}$. Such a concept name might be (partly) computed, e.g. if we write $(\forall R . D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, T)}$ and $\operatorname{con}(S, T)=U$, then $(\forall R . D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, T)}=(\forall R . D)_{U}$. The following example will make the transformation more transparent: if

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C=(\exists S \cdot(\neg D \sqcup \exists R \cdot \exists R \cdot \exists R . \neg D)) \sqcap(\forall S \cdot(D \sqcap \forall R \cdot D)), \\
& \mathfrak{R}=\{R \circ R \sqsubseteq R, S \circ R \sqsubseteq R, R \circ S \sqsubseteq R, S \circ S \sqsubseteq R\},
\end{aligned}
$$

then the resulting TBox $\mathfrak{T}$ will be

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathfrak{T}=\{\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D) \sqsubseteq \forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D), \\
& \forall R . D \sqsubseteq \forall R . D \text {, } \\
& (\forall R . D)_{R} \sqsubseteq D \text {, } \\
& (\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{S} \sqsubseteq(D \sqcap \forall R . D) \text {, } \\
& \forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D) \sqsubseteq \forall S .(\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{S}, \\
& \forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D) \sqsubseteq \forall R .(\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{R} \text {, } \\
& \forall R . D \sqsubseteq \forall S .(\forall R . D)_{S} \text {, } \\
& \forall R . D \sqsubseteq \forall R .(\forall R . D)_{R} \text {, } \\
& (\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{S} \sqsubseteq \forall S .(\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{R} \text {, } \\
& (\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{S} \sqsubseteq \forall R .(\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{R}, \\
& (\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{R} \sqsubseteq \forall S .(\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{R} \text {, } \\
& (\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{R} \sqsubseteq \forall R .(\forall S .(D \sqcap \forall R . D))_{R}, \\
& (\forall R . D)_{S} \sqsubseteq \forall S .(\forall R . D)_{R} \text {, } \\
& (\forall R . D)_{S} \sqsubseteq \forall R .(\forall R . D)_{R}, \\
& (\forall R . D)_{R} \sqsubseteq \forall S \cdot(\forall R . D)_{R} \text {, } \\
& \left.\overline{(\forall R \cdot D)_{R}} \sqsubseteq \forall R . \overline{(\forall R \cdot D)_{R}}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

The following Lemma closes the gap in the previous proof of EXPTIME-completeness of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ :

Lemma 6 Let $C$ be in NNF, and $\mathfrak{R}$ be an admissible role box for $\mathfrak{R}$, and let $\mathfrak{T}$ be the TBox as defined above. Then, $(C, \mathfrak{T})$ is satisfiable iff $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is.

Proof $\mathbf{8} \Leftarrow$ Let $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{R})$ be a tree skeleton model. $\mathcal{S K E} \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{I})$ has the form of a possibly infinite tree (according to the Proof of Lemma 1 there is always such a model if $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is satisfiable at all), $\mathcal{I}=\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)$. We can then define $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}=\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, .^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}\right)$ such that $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models(C, \mathfrak{T})$ :

- $R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}={ }_{\text {def }} R^{\mathcal{I}} \cap \operatorname{SKE} \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{I})$, for all roles $R \in \operatorname{roles}(C)$,
- $D^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}={ }_{\text {def }} D^{\mathcal{I}}$, for all concept names $D \in \operatorname{sub}(C) \cap \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}}$,
- $\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}={ }_{\text {def }}(\forall R \cdot D)^{\mathcal{I}}$, for all $\forall R . D \in \operatorname{sub}(C)$,
- $(\forall R . D)_{S}^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}=_{\text {def }}\left\{x \mid \exists y:\left\langle x, y>\in S^{\mathcal{I}}, x \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}\right\}\right.$, for all $(\forall R . D)_{S} \in \operatorname{sub}(\mathfrak{T})$, and $S \in \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{T}) \cup \operatorname{roles}(C)$ $($ please note that roles $(\mathfrak{R})=\operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{T})$ ),
- $\emptyset$, for all other not mentioned concept and role names.

Because $\mathcal{I} \models C$ and $\mathcal{I}$ is a tree skeleton model, it is still the case that $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models C$. We can safely interpret the irrelevant concept and role names with the empty set, due to Proposition 1. Even though the interpretation of the roles has been changed by discarding the "indirect" edges in the interpretations, it is still the case that the existential value restrictions which occur in $C$ are interpreted correctly: for all $\exists R . D \in \operatorname{sub}(C)$, if $x \in(\exists R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$, then also $x \in(\exists R . D)^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$, since $\mathcal{I}$ is a tree skeleton model. For the other types of subconcepts this is also obvious. Therefore, $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models C$.
We also have to show that $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models \mathfrak{T}$. According to the transformation, there are four types of GCIs, and we show that each GCI is satisfied by $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$ :

- $\forall R . D \sqsubseteq \forall R . D$ : obvious by the definition of $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$.
- $\forall R . D \sqsubseteq \forall\left(\sqcup_{S \in \operatorname{roles}(C) \cup r o l e s}(\Re) S\right) .(\forall R . D)_{S}$ : suppose there is some individual $x \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ with $x \in\left(\forall R \cdot D^{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}\right)$, but
$x \notin\left(\forall\left(\sqcup_{S \in \text { roles }(C) \text { Uroles }(\mathfrak{R})} S\right) \cdot(\forall R . D)_{S}\right)^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$. Then there must be some individual $y$, with $\langle x, y\rangle \in T^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}, T \in \operatorname{roles}(C) \cup \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{T})$, with $y \notin$ $\left[(\forall R \cdot D)_{T}\right]^{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}$. According to the definition of $T^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$, also $\langle x, y\rangle \in T^{\mathcal{I}}$. But since $x \in \forall R . D \Psi^{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}$ we have by construction of $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$ also $x \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and therefore $\left.y \in(\forall R \cdot D)_{T}\right]^{T^{\prime}}$, contradicting the assumption.
- $(\forall R . D)_{R} \sqsubseteq D$ : if $\left.y \in(\forall R . D)_{R}\right)^{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}$, then there is some $x$ with $\langle x, y>\in$ $R^{\mathcal{I}}$, and $x \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $\mathcal{I} \models C$, it must be the case that $y \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$.
- $(\forall R . D)_{S} \sqsubseteq \forall\left(\sqcup_{T \in \operatorname{roles}(C) \mathrm{Uroles}(\mathfrak{R})} T\right) \cdot(\forall R . D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, T)}$ : suppose there is some node $x \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ with $\left.x \in(\forall R . D)_{S}\right]^{\mathcal{T}}$, but
$x \notin\left(\forall\left(\sqcup_{T \in \operatorname{roles}(C) \cup \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})} T\right) .(\forall R . D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, T)}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then there must be some individual $y$, with $\langle x, y\rangle \in T^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}, T \in \operatorname{roles}(C) \cup \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{T})$, with $\left.y \notin(\forall R \cdot D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, T)}\right]^{T^{\prime}}$. However, due to $\left.x \in(\forall R \cdot D)_{S}\right]^{\mathcal{T}}$ there is some $w \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}},\langle w, x\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $\mathfrak{R}$ is admissible for $C$, there must be some role axiom $r a$ with $\operatorname{con}(r a)=\operatorname{con}(S, T)$. Due to $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{R}$, $<w, y>\in(\operatorname{con}(S, T))^{\mathcal{I}}$, which shows that $y \in(\forall R . D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, T)}{ }^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$ by definition of $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$, contradicting the assumption.
$\Rightarrow$ Let $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{T})$ be a possibly infinite tree model. Again we emphasize that there is no loss of generality by considering only this class of models. We then define $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$ such that that $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models(C, \mathfrak{R})$. $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$ is a tree skeleton model. If $\mathcal{I}=\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}},{ }^{\mathcal{I}}\right)$, then $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}=\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}^{\prime}\right)$ is defined as follows:
- $D^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}={ }_{\text {def }} D^{\mathcal{I}}$, for all concept names $D \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}} \cap \operatorname{sub}(C)$
- $R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}={ }_{\text {def }} R^{\mathcal{I}}$, for all role names $R \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}} \cap \operatorname{roles}(C)$
- while $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \notin \mathfrak{R}$ do
for each $R \circ S \sqsubseteq T \in \mathfrak{R}$ do $T^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}:=T^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}} \cup R^{\overline{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}} \circ S^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$
od
od
- $\emptyset$, for all other not mentioned concept and role names.

It is obvious by definition of $\cdot \cdot^{\prime}$ that $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models \mathfrak{R}$.
However, since the interpretations of the relevant roles have been extended ( $R^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$; if $R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$ has been set to $\emptyset$, then $R$ is irrelevant) it is not obvious that the universal value restrictions are still interpreted correctly - for all other subconcepts of $C$ it is obvious that they are still interpreted correctly.
If $x \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$, then we have to show that still $x \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$. Assume that $x \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$, but $x \notin(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$. Then, there must be some $y \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, with $\left\langle x, y>\in R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}},\langle x, y\rangle \notin R^{\mathcal{I}}\right.$, and $y \notin D^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}, y \notin D^{\mathcal{I}}$, since otherwise already $x \notin(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$. We have to show that $y \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$ : let $w$ be the path in the tree model connecting $x$ and $y, w=R_{1} R_{2} \ldots R_{n}$, and call the nodes lying on the path $x_{i}$, with $x=x_{0}, y=x_{n},\left\langle x_{0}, x_{1}\right\rangle \in R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}},\left\langle x_{1}, x_{2}\right\rangle \in R_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}, \ldots$, $\left\langle x_{n-1}, x_{n}\right\rangle \in R_{n}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{T}, x_{0} \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $\forall R . D \sqsubseteq \forall R . D \in \mathfrak{T}$, also $x_{0} \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $x_{0} \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and
$\forall R . D \sqsubseteq \forall\left(\sqcup_{S \in \operatorname{roles}(C) \cup \operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})} S\right) \cdot(\forall R . D)_{S} \in \mathfrak{T}$ with $\left\langle x_{0}, x_{1}\right\rangle \in R_{1}^{\mathcal{T}}$, also $x_{1} \in(\forall R . D)_{R 1}{ }^{\mathcal{I}}$. From $x_{1} \in(\forall R . D)_{R 1}{ }^{\mathcal{T}}$ and $\left\langle x_{1}, x_{2}\right\rangle \in R_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$ we conclude that $x_{2} \in(\forall R . D)_{\operatorname{con}(R 1, R 2)}{ }^{\mathcal{T}}$, due to
$(\forall R . D)_{S} \sqsubseteq \forall\left(\sqcup_{T \in \text { roles }(C) \text { Uroles }(\mathfrak{R})} T\right) .(\forall R . D)_{\operatorname{con}(S, T)} \in \mathfrak{T}$. An iterative application of this GCI finally gives $y=x_{n} \in(\forall R . D)_{R}{ }^{\mathcal{T}}$. Due to $(\forall R . D)_{R} \sqsubseteq$ $D \in \mathfrak{T}$ we have $y \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$. Please note that we really know that $y \in$ $\left.(\forall R . D)_{R}\right]^{\mathcal{I}}$ and not only $\left.y \in(\forall R . D)_{S}\right]^{\mathcal{T}}$, for some role $S$ - if $\langle x, y\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$ and $w$ is the path connecting $x$ and $y$, then due to the associativity of the role box, every composition possibility yields the same role, in this case $R$. By which sequence of composition possibilities $\langle x, y\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$ has been obtained is irrelevant. For example, if $w=R_{1} R_{2} R_{3}$, we know that $y \in(\forall R . D)_{R}{ }^{\mathcal{I}}$, since the result of $\operatorname{con}(\operatorname{con}(R 1, R 2), R 3)$ must be $R$, no matter how $\langle x, y\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}$ has been obtained in the while loop (e.g., it might have been obtained by $\left(\operatorname{con}\left(R_{2}, R_{3}\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}:=R_{2}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ R_{3}^{\mathcal{I}}$ followed by $\left.R^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}=\left(\operatorname{con}\left(R_{1}, \operatorname{con}\left(R_{2}, R_{3}\right)\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}:=R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ\left(\operatorname{con}\left(R_{2}, R_{3}\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}^{\prime}}\right)$. This shows that $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models C$, and summing up we have shown that $\mathcal{I}^{\prime} \models(C, \mathfrak{R})$.

## $5 \mathcal{A L C N}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$ is Undecidable

Since $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$ is decidable, the question arises naturally whether further extensions of $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, e.g. by inverse roles $(\mathcal{I})$ or unqualified number restrictions $(\mathcal{N})$, still remain decidable. We show that even if only unqualified number restrictions (which are usually an easy and unproblematic extension of DLs) are added to $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, the resulting logic $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ is undecidable again. Obviously, since $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ is a sub-logic of $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}, \mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$ is undecidable as well; and the same obviously also holds for qualified number restrictions $\left(\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{Q}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}, \mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{Q}_{\mathcal{R A}}\right)$. The proof is very similar to the ones given by Sattler in [11], where it is shown that the languages $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}{ }_{+} \mathcal{N}(\circ, \sqcup), \mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C N}\left(\circ, \sqcup,{ }^{-1}\right)$, $\mathcal{A L C N}(\circ, \sqcap)$ and $\mathcal{A L C}{ }_{+} \mathcal{N}(\circ)$ are all undecidable.
To obtain $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, the syntax of concept terms is extended by incorporating the constructor called $\mathcal{N}$, with the following additional concept formation rule:

- If $R \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}$ is a role and $n \in \mathbb{N} \cup\{0\}$, then the expressions $(\geq R n)$ and $(\leq R n)$ are concepts as well.

The operators roles and sub are appropriately modified, e.g. roles $((\geq R n))=$ $\{R\}$, etc. Still, for a role box $\mathfrak{R}$ that is admissible for a concept $C$, $\operatorname{roles}(C) \subseteq$ $\operatorname{roles}(\mathfrak{R})$ must hold, but with the modified definition of the operator roles.
The semantics is defined in the obvious way:

- $(\geq R n)^{\mathcal{I}}=_{\text {def }}\left\{i \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \#\left(R^{\mathcal{I}} \cap\left(\{i\} \times \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right)\right) \geq n\right\}$
- $(\leq R n)^{\mathcal{I}}=_{\text {def }}\left\{i \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \#\left(R^{\mathcal{I}} \cap\left(\{i\} \times \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right)\right) \leq n\right\}$.

The undecidability proof of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ is given by a reduction from the so-called domino problem:

Definition 12 (Domino System) A domino system $\mathcal{D} \mathcal{O} \mathcal{M}$ is a triple $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{V})$, where $\mathcal{D}=\left\{d_{1}, \ldots, d_{n}\right\}$ is a non-empty set of so-called domino types, $\mathcal{V} \subseteq \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{D}$ is the vertical matching relation, and $\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{D}$ is the horizontal matching relation.

A solution of a domino system is a function $\mathrm{f}: \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}$ (in the following we assume that $0 \in \mathbb{N}$ ) such that the matching relationships of the domino types are respected, i.e. for all $(i, j) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}:(f(i, j), f(i+1, j)) \in \mathcal{H}$ and $(\mathrm{f}(i, j), \mathrm{f}(i, j+1)) \in \mathcal{V}$.

It is an undecidable problem whether a domino system has a solution; i.e., f is a non-recursive (uncomputable) function. Given an arbitrary domino system $\mathcal{D O} \mathcal{M}$ we construct an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$ concept $C$ and a role box $\mathfrak{R}$ that is admissible for $C$ such that $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is satisfiable iff $\mathcal{D O} \mathcal{M}$ has a solution. The role box $\mathfrak{R}$ corresponds to the following composition table:

| $\circ$ | $R_{X}$ | $R_{Y}$ | $R_{Z}$ | $R_{U}$ |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $R_{X}$ | $R_{U}$ | $R_{Z}$ | $R_{U}$ | $R_{U}$ |
| $R_{Y}$ | $R_{Z}$ | $R_{U}$ | $R_{U}$ | $R_{U}$ |
| $R_{Z}$ | $R_{U}$ | $R_{U}$ | $R_{U}$ | $R_{U}$ |
| $R_{U}$ | $R_{U}$ | $R_{U}$ | $R_{U}$ | $R_{U}$ |

Therefore, $\mathfrak{R}={ }_{\text {def }}\left\{R_{X} \circ R_{X} \sqsubseteq R_{U}, R_{X} \circ R_{Y} \sqsubseteq R_{Z}, \ldots\right\}$. Obviously, $\mathfrak{R}$ is associative. Let $\mathcal{D} \mathcal{O} \mathcal{M}=(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{V})$ and further assume, that $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}}$. Now, the concept $C$ can be defined:

$$
\begin{array}{cl}
C==_{\text {def }} & X \sqcap\left(\forall R_{X} \cdot X\right) \sqcap\left(\forall R_{Y} \cdot X\right) \sqcap\left(\forall R_{Z} \cdot X\right) \sqcap\left(\forall R_{U} \cdot X\right), \text { where } \\
X==_{\text {def }} & M \sqcap\left(\geq R_{X} 1\right) \sqcap\left(\geq R_{Y} 1\right) \sqcap \\
& \left(\leq R_{X} 1\right) \sqcap\left(\leq R_{Y} 1\right) \sqcap\left(\leq R_{Z} 1\right), \text { and } \\
M=\text { def } & \sqcup_{D_{i} \in \mathcal{D}}\left(D_{i} \sqcap\left(\sqcap_{D_{j} \in \mathcal{D}, D_{i} \neq D_{j}} \neg D_{j}\right)\right) \sqcap \\
& \sqcap_{D_{i} \in \mathcal{D}}\left(D _ { i } \Rightarrow \left(\forall R_{X} \cdot\left(\sqcup_{\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{H}} D_{j}\right) \sqcap\right.\right. \\
& \left.\left.\forall R_{Y} .\left(\sqcup_{\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{V}} D_{j}\right)\right)\right)
\end{array}
$$

Obviously, $\mathfrak{R}$ is an admissible role box for $C$.
Lemma $7(C, \mathfrak{R})$ is satisfiable iff the domino system $\mathcal{D O} \mathcal{M}=(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{V})$ has a solution.

Proof $9 " \Rightarrow$ " Let $\mathcal{I} \models(C, R)$, with $x_{0,0} \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$. Using $\mathcal{I}$ we construct a solution f of $\mathcal{D} \mathcal{O} \mathcal{M}$ as follows:

- $\mathrm{f}(m, n)=_{\text {def }} D$ iff $\left\langle x_{0,0}, x_{m, n}\right\rangle \in\left(R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{m} \circ\left(R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{n}$, for some $m, n \in$ $\mathbb{N} \cup\{0\}$ and $x_{m, n} \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$ for some $D \in \mathcal{D}$.
Please note that $\left(R^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{n}=_{\operatorname{def}} \underbrace{R^{\mathcal{I}} \circ R^{\mathcal{I}} \circ \ldots \circ R^{\mathcal{I}}}_{n \text { times }}$, and

$$
\left.\left(R^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{0}=_{\text {def }}\left\{\langle x, x\rangle \mid x \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right\} . \text { Hence }<x_{0,0}, x_{0,0}\right\rangle \in\left(R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{0} \circ\left(R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{0} .
$$

We have to show that

1. f is well-defined; i.e. that f really defines a total function $f: \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow$ $\mathcal{D}$, and that
2. f is indeed a solution to the domino problem; i.e. that the matching conditions $(\mathbf{f}(m, n), \mathbf{f}(m+1, n)) \in \mathcal{H}$ and $(f(m, n), f(m, n+1)) \in \mathcal{V}$ are satisfied for all $(m, n) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$.

To show 1 , we observe that $x_{0,0} \in X^{\mathcal{I}}$, also $x_{0,0} \in M^{\mathcal{I}}$, and therefore, $x_{0,0} \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$ for exactly one $D \in \mathcal{D}$ (see definition of $M$, first conjunct). Due to $\left\langle x_{0,0}, x_{0,0}\right\rangle \in\left(R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{0} \circ\left(R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{0}$ for $m=0, n=0$ we have $\mathrm{f}(0,0)=D$. Now, since $x_{0,0} \in\left(\left(=R_{X} 1\right) \sqcap\left(=R_{Y} 1\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ there is exactly one successor $x_{1,0}$ with $<x_{0,0}, x_{1,0}>\in R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and exactly one successor $x_{0,1}$ with $\left\langle x_{0,0}, x_{0,1}\right\rangle \in R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Note that it is important that these successors are uniquely defined, since f would be ambiguous otherwise. Due to $x_{0,0} \in\left(\left(\forall R_{X} \cdot X\right) \sqcap\left(\forall R_{Y} \cdot X\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ we have $x_{1,0}, x_{0,1} \in X^{\mathcal{I}}$. We conclude that also $x_{1,0} \in D_{i}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $x_{0,1} \in$ $D_{j}^{\mathcal{I}}$, for exactly one $D_{i}$ resp. $D_{j}$. Since $<x_{0,0}, x_{1,0}>\in\left(R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{1} \circ\left(R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{0}$ and $<x_{0,0}, x_{0,1}>\in\left(R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{0} \circ\left(R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{1}$ this shows that $\mathrm{f}(1,0)=D_{i}$ and $\mathrm{f}(0,1)=D_{j}$ are well-defined. Again, due to $x_{1,0}, x_{0,1} \in X^{\mathcal{I}}$, both have exactly one $R_{X}$ and one $R_{Y}$ successor. Since $\left\{R_{X} \circ R_{Y} \sqsubseteq R_{Z}, R_{Y} \circ R_{X} \sqsubseteq R_{Z}\right\} \subseteq \mathfrak{R}$ these successors are also $R_{Z}$-successors of $x_{0,0}$, and since $x_{0,0} \in\left(\leq R_{Z} 1\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ the $\left(R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{1} \circ\left(R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{1}$-successor of $x_{0,0}$ coincides with its $R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}$-successor, for $n=1, m=1$. Because $x_{0,0} \in\left(\forall R_{Z} \cdot X\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ we have $x_{1,1} \in X^{\mathcal{I}}, x_{1,1} \in M^{\mathcal{I}}$ and finally $x_{1,1} \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$, for exactly one $D$. This shows that $\mathrm{f}(1,1)=D$ is welldefined. Again, due to $\left\{x_{1,0}, x_{0,1}, x_{1,1}\right\} \subseteq X^{\mathcal{I}}$, all have exactly one $R_{X}$ and $R_{Y}$ successor. Due to $\left\{R_{Z} \circ R_{X} \sqsubseteq R_{U}, R_{Z} \circ R_{Y} \sqsubseteq R_{U}, R_{X} \circ R_{X} \sqsubseteq R_{U}, R_{Y} \circ\right.$ $\left.R_{Y} \sqsubseteq R_{U}\right\} \subseteq \mathfrak{R}$, these successors are $R_{U}$-successors of $x_{0,0}$, and therefore they are members of $X^{\mathcal{I}}$ as well, because $x_{0,0} \in\left(\forall R_{U} \cdot X\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Again, due to $\left\{R_{U} \circ R_{X} \sqsubseteq R_{U}, R_{U} \circ R_{Y} \sqsubseteq R_{U}\right\} \subseteq \mathfrak{R}$, their successors will also $R_{U^{-}}$ successor of $x_{0,0}$, etc. Summing up, if $\left\langle x_{0,0}, x_{m, n}\right\rangle \in\left(R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{m} \circ\left(R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{n}$, then also $<x_{0,0}, x_{m, n}>\in\left(R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{n} \circ\left(R_{X}^{\mathcal{T}}\right)^{m}$, and $<x_{0,0}, x_{m, n}>\in R_{i}^{\mathcal{T}}$ for exactly one $R_{i} \in\left\{R_{X}, R_{Y}, R_{Z}, R_{U}\right\}$, which shows that for all individuals reachable via $<x_{0,0}, x_{m, n}>\in\left(R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{m} \circ\left(R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{n}, x_{m, n} \in X^{\mathcal{I}}$ holds. Therefore, $\mathrm{f}(m, n)$ is well-defined.

To show 2, it suffices to observe that all individuals that are reachable from $\left\langle x_{0,0}, x_{m, n}\right\rangle \in\left(R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{m} \circ\left(R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{n}$, for some $m, n \in \mathbb{N} \cup\{0\}, x_{m, n} \in X^{\mathcal{I}}$ holds, and therefore also $x_{m, n} \in M^{\mathcal{I}}$. The second conjunct of $M\left(D_{i} \Rightarrow\right.$ $\left.\left(\forall R_{X} \cdot\left(\sqcup_{\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{H}} D_{j}\right) \sqcap \forall R_{Y} \cdot\left(\sqcup_{\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{V}} D_{j}\right)\right)\right)$ obviously enforces that the horizontal and vertical matching conditions are satisfied, and (as already noted) the first condition ensures that $x_{m, n} \in D_{i}^{\mathcal{I}}$, for some $D_{i} \in \mathcal{D}$.

Summing up we have shown that f (as constructed above) is a solution to $\mathcal{D O M}$.
" $\Leftarrow "$ Let f be a solution of $\mathcal{D} \mathcal{O} \mathcal{M}=(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{V})$. Using f we construct an infinite interpretation $\mathcal{I}=\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}},{ }^{\mathcal{I}}\right)$ such that $\mathcal{I} \models(C, \mathfrak{R})$ and all roles are interpreted as disjoint:

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=_{\text {def }}\left\{x_{i, j} \mid(i, j) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}\right\}$
- $D^{\mathcal{I}}=_{\text {def }}\left\{x_{i, j} \mid \mathrm{f}(i, j)=D\right\}$ for all $D \in \mathcal{D O M}$
- $R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}=_{\text {def }}\left\{\left(x_{i, j}, x_{i+1, j}\right) \mid(i, j) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}\right\}$
- $R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}=_{\text {def }}\left\{\left(x_{i, j}, x_{i, j+1}\right) \mid(i, j) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}\right\}$
- $R_{Z}^{\mathcal{I}}={ }_{\text {def }}\left\{\left(x_{i, j}, x_{i+1, j+1}\right) \mid(i, j) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}\right\}$
- $R_{U}^{\mathcal{I}}=_{\text {def }}\left(\Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \times \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right) \backslash\left(\left\{(i, i) \mid i \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right\} \cup R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}} \cup R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}} \cup R_{Z}^{\mathcal{I}}\right)$

First of all its is obviously the case that all roles are interpreted as disjoint. It is also easy to check that $\mathcal{I} \models \mathfrak{R}$, i.e. $R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq R_{Z}^{\mathcal{I}}, R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq R_{Z}^{\mathcal{I}}$, etc. We show that $\mathcal{I} \models C$, due to $x_{0,0} \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$. We first prove that $M^{\mathcal{I}}=$ $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ (recall that $M=$ def $\sqcup_{D_{i} \in \mathcal{D}}\left(D_{i} \sqcap\left(\sqcap_{D_{j} \in \mathcal{D}, D_{i} \neq D_{j}} \neg D_{j}\right)\right) \sqcap\left(\sqcap_{D_{i} \in \mathcal{D}}\left(D_{i} \Rightarrow\right.\right.$ $\left.\left.\left(\forall R_{X} \cdot\left(\sqcup_{\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{H}} D_{j}\right) \sqcap \forall R_{Y} .\left(\sqcup_{\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{V}} D_{j}\right)\right)\right)\right)$. Suppose that $x_{x, y} \notin M^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then, either $x_{x, y} \notin\left(\sqcup_{D_{i} \in \mathcal{D}}\left(D_{i} \sqcap\left(\sqcap_{D_{j} \in \mathcal{D}, D_{i} \neq D_{j}} \neg D_{j}\right)\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ or
$x_{x, y} \notin\left(\sqcap_{D_{i} \in \mathcal{D}}\left(D_{i} \Rightarrow\left(\forall R_{X} .\left(\sqcup_{\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{H}} D_{j}\right) \sqcap \forall R_{Y} .\left(\sqcup_{\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{V}} D_{j}\right)\right)\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. In the first case, the contradiction is derived immediately, since f is a total function that maps elements from $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ to $\mathcal{D}$. In the second case, the contradiction is due to the fact that f is a solution of $\mathcal{D O} \mathcal{M}$ : if $x_{x, y} \in D_{i}^{\mathcal{I}}$ for some $D_{i} \in \mathcal{D}$, then $\mathrm{f}(x, y)=D_{i}$, and due to the matching conditions also $\left(D_{i}, \mathrm{f}(x+1, y)\right) \in \mathcal{H}$ and $\left(D_{i}, \mathrm{f}(x, y+1)\right) \in \mathcal{V}$. If $\mathrm{f}(x+1, y)=D_{j}$ and $\mathrm{f}(x, y+1)=D_{k}$, then $\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{H},\left(D_{i}, D_{k}\right) \in \mathcal{V}$ and by construction of ${ }^{\mathcal{I}}$ also $x_{x+1, y} \in D_{j}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $x_{x, y+1} \in D_{k}^{\mathcal{I}}$. But since $\left\{x_{x+1, y}\right\}=$ $\left\{x_{x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}} \mid<x_{x, y}, x_{x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}}>\in R_{X}^{\mathcal{T}}\right\}$ and $\left\{x_{x, y+1}\right\}=\left\{x_{x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}} \mid<x_{x, y}, x_{x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}}>\in R_{Y}^{\mathcal{T}}\right\}$ (by definition of $\cdot{ }^{\mathcal{I}}$ ) we have $x_{x, y} \in\left(\left(\forall R_{X} \cdot D_{j}\right) \sqcap\left(\forall R_{Y} \cdot D_{k}\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and therefore $x_{x, y} \in\left(\forall R_{X} .\left(\sqcup_{\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{H}} D_{j}\right) \sqcap \forall R_{Y} .\left(\sqcup_{\left(D_{i}, D_{j}\right) \in \mathcal{V}} D_{j}\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Contradiction. This shows that $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=M^{\mathcal{I}}$. Now it is easy to see that also $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=X^{\mathcal{I}}$ : for all $x_{x, y} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ we even have $x_{x, y} \in\left(M \sqcap\left(=R_{X} 1\right) \sqcap\left(=R_{Y} 1\right) \sqcap\left(=R_{Z} 1\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ (obviously, $(=R 1)$ is an abbreviation for $(\leq R 1) \sqcap(\geq R 1)$ ), due to $\left\{x_{x+1, y}\right\}=$ $\left\{x_{x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}} \mid<x_{x, y}, x_{x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}}>\in R_{X}^{\mathcal{I}}\right\},\left\{x_{x, y+1}\right\}=\left\{x_{x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}} \mid<x_{x, y}, x_{x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}}>\in R_{Y}^{\mathcal{I}}\right\}$,
and $\left\{x_{x+1, y+1}\right\}=\left\{x_{x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}}\left|<x_{x, y}, x_{x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}}\right\rangle \in R_{Z}^{\mathcal{I}}\right\}$. But then it is also clear that $x_{x, y} \in\left(X \sqcap\left(\forall R_{X} \cdot X\right) \sqcap\left(\forall R_{Y} \cdot X\right) \sqcap\left(\forall R_{Z} \cdot X\right) \sqcap\left(\forall R_{U} \cdot X\right)\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and hence $x_{0,0} \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$.

Summing up we have shown that $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C N}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ is undecidable, and therefore also $\mathcal{A L C N}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, as well as other super-logics like $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} \mathcal{Q}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}, \mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} \mathcal{Q}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, etc. ( $\mathcal{Q}$ for qualified number restrictions). Of course, it does not make sense to consider the languages $\mathcal{A L C H} \mathcal{R A S G}$ and $\mathcal{A L C H}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, since role hierarchies (operator $\mathcal{H}$ ) provide an immediate contradiction to the assumed roles disjointness. Obviously it also doesn't make sense to consider $\mathcal{A L C H}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, since $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A} \ominus}$ is already undecidable.

However, it might be possible that the language $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$ is still decidable. This has to be investigated in the future.

## 6 Summary, Discussion and Future Work

We have identified the language $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ as a decidable fragment both of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ and $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A} \ominus}$. Due to the admissibility of role boxes it is impossible to enforce non-empty role intersections in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$. Please note that this does not hold for $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ :
Please observe that

$$
\begin{gathered}
(\exists R .((\exists S . \exists T . T) \sqcap \forall Y . \perp) \sqcap \forall A . \perp, \mathfrak{R}(C)) \\
\text { w.r.t. } \\
\{R \circ S \sqsubseteq A \sqcup B, S \circ T \sqsubseteq X \sqcup Y, A \circ T \sqsubseteq U, B \circ T \sqsubseteq V, R \circ X \sqsubseteq U, R \circ Y \sqsubseteq V\}
\end{gathered}
$$

enforces a non-empty intersection between $U$ and $V$. This example is therefore satisfiable in $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$, but not in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$. Obviously, any $(C, \mathfrak{R})$ which is satisfiable in $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ is also satisfiable in $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}{ }^{\ominus}$, but the converse does not hold, as the given example demonstrates.

In [16], we have proposed a tableaux calculus for $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ which is similar to the one given here, but we were unable to prove soundness, completeness and termination. Like for $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, a complete role box $\mathfrak{R}$ was needed for this calculus (see [16], [15] for a discussion). Comparing the $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ tableaux calculus with the $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ calculus, one can see that a major source of non-determinism is absent in the latter. A major difference is that the $\exists \forall$-rule was non-deterministic in the $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ calculus, see Figure 3. The different choices for the labels of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{j}\right)$ correspond to the different composition-possibilities caused by the disjunctions

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\(\exists \forall\)-rule for \(\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}}\) :
if \(1 . \exists R . C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)\)
    2. neither the \(\square\) - nor the \(\sqcup\) - nor the
        \(\forall\)-rule is applicable to \(x_{i}\)
    3. \(\neg \exists\left\langle x_{i}, x_{j}>\in \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}: C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{j}\right)\right.\)
    4. \(x_{i}\) is not blocked
then create a new node \(x_{j}\) with
    \(\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}\left(\left\langle x_{i}, x_{j}\right\rangle\right):=R, \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{j}\right):=\mathcal{L}\),
    where \(\mathcal{W}=\{(w, S) \mid\)
                \(\left.(\forall T . D)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)\right\}\),
        and \(\mathcal{L}\) is some set that can
        non-deterministically be constructed by:
                for all \((w, S) \in \mathcal{W}\) :
            choose some \(U \in \operatorname{con}(S, R)\) :
                \(\mathcal{C}(w)=\left\{(\forall T . D)_{U, w R} \mid\right.\)
                        \(\left.(\forall T . D)_{S, w} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)\right\}\)
        \(\mathcal{L}=\left\{C_{1}\right\} \cup\left\{\forall R_{?} . \top\right\} \cup\)
        \(\bigcup_{(w, S) \in \mathcal{W}} \mathcal{C}(w) \cup\)
        \(\left\{(\forall T . D)_{R, R} \mid \forall T . D \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}}\left(x_{i}\right)\right\}\)
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Figure 3: The $\exists \forall$-rule for $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$
on the right-hand side of the role axioms $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$. However, nondeterministic role axioms are not allowed in admissible $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ role boxes, and therefore, this source of complexity resp. non-determinism is absent.
When constructing the completion tree with the $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ calculus, an additional clash-trigger was needed. In the previous example which enforces a non-empty intersection between $U$ and $V$, a so-called role-box clash would be detected. In order to be able to detect such clashes, this clash-trigger had to be "path global". In fact, the clash-trigger had to consider the labels of all individual lying on one path and check whether there are some edges $R, S, T$ corresponding to a situation where $\langle x, y\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}},\langle y, z\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}},\langle x, z\rangle \in T^{\mathcal{I}}$, but $T \notin \operatorname{con}(R, S)$. Of course, this corresponds to a violation of the disjointness requirement.

The problem with the $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ calculus was the lack of an appropriate blocking condition (see the fourth precondition of the $\exists \forall$-rule in Figure 3). When constructing the infinite tableau by "unraveling" the blocked completion tree, the blocking condition has to ensure that each path can be extended infinitely without producing a violation of the disjointness requirement at some time in the unraveling process. This infinite unraveling of the completion tree is unproblematic in $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$, due to the associativity, and ensures that no new composition possibilities can arise that might violate the disjointness requirement at some
point during the unraveling. This problem is unsolved for $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ and might very well be undecidable. More precisely, the question is: under which circumstances is it possible to infinitely continue a path in the completion tree such that the same "pattern" of role combinations reproduces itself? Having identified the major differences between $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ and $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, we have gained new insights that might be fruitful when reconsidering $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ again, since it is still left open whether $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ might be decidable or not.
Having identified the major differences between $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ and $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$, we have gained new insights that might be fruitful when reconsidering $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ again, since it is still left open whether $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ might be decidable or not. We have shown that $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ (and therefore also $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R A}}$ ) is again undecidable. Therefore, extending $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ is not an easy task. For example, whether inverse roles can be incorporated into the language (yielding $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{R A S G}}$ ) is an open question.
Unfortunately, the proposed admissibility criterion for role boxes is very strong, singling out a lot of useful role boxes as invalid. However, we believe that admissible role boxes can be constructed, e.g. for spatial reasoning tasks like in [15]. For example, if one considers the relational composition table of the RCC8 calculus (in fact, the underlying structure is even a relation algebra), then this composition table is associative, but in a more general sense, since disjunctions appear on the right hand side of role axioms. An other promising idea might be to gives names to disjunctions of base relations and "expand" the composition table such that no disjunctions appear any longer. A role axiom of the form $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup R_{n}$ would be substituted by $S \circ T \sqsubseteq R_{1} R_{2} \ldots R_{n}$, where the new role name $R_{1} R_{2} \ldots R_{n} \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}$ represents the disjunction of the listed roles, and the composition table would be augmented by additional role axioms, such that the overall structure is maintained. Of course, a role name must be given to every possible disjunction, yielding an exponential blow up in the number of roles. Even though the composition table would be exponentially larger than the original one, it might probably be associative and useful for spatial reasoning. These transformations and applications of $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$ have to be worked out in the future.

For the further exploration of $\mathcal{A L C}$ in combination with role boxes it seems that one key is to consider certain kinds of role boxes such that the mathematical properties of the underlying structures can be exploited. It might also be possible to exploit automata-based techniques (e.g. Büchi-automata on infinite trees).

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ In the former case we have
    $\left\{x \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \forall y:\langle x, y\rangle \in R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ \ldots \circ R_{n}^{\mathcal{I}} \Rightarrow\langle x, y\rangle \in S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ \ldots \circ S_{m}^{\mathcal{I}}\right\} \subseteq \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, and in the latter $\left\{x \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \forall y:\langle x, y\rangle \in R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ \ldots \circ R_{n}^{\mathcal{I}} \Rightarrow\langle x, y\rangle \in S_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \circ \ldots \circ S_{m}^{\mathcal{I}}\right\}=\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Almost all expressive description logics were also build in a step-by-step fashion, e.g., after $\mathcal{A L C}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$had been introduced, $\mathcal{A L C H}_{\mathcal{R}^{+}}$was defined, and so on.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ Please note that, due to the disjointness requirement, the restriction to functional role boxes is not really a restriction, since non-functional role boxes, e.g. with $\left\{R \circ S \sqsubseteq T_{1}, R \circ S \sqsubseteq\right.$ $\left.T_{2}\right\} \subseteq \mathfrak{R}$ and $T_{1} \neq T_{2}$, would not have a model anyway, if $R^{\mathcal{I}} \circ S^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ The non-empty intersection problem for two grammars $\mathcal{G}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{G}_{2}$ is to decide whether $\mathcal{L}\left(\mathcal{G}_{1}\right) \cap \mathcal{L}\left(\mathcal{G}_{2}\right)=\emptyset$.
    ${ }^{5}$ In order to evaluate the truth-value of a modal logic formula, a Kripke interpretation is needed. Such a Kripke interpretation consists of a frame and a valuation function. The frame provides a set of worlds and, for each modality $i$, an accessibility relation $\mathcal{R}_{i}$. The valuation function determines for each world and proposition whether this proposition holds at this world or not.

[^4]:    ${ }^{6}$ Thanks to Stéphane Demri

[^5]:    ${ }^{7}$ In fact, instead of the used equal blocking, also subset blocking would work for $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}_{\mathcal{R} \mathcal{A S G}}$; however, this has no impact on the worst-case complexity of the algorithm.

[^6]:    ${ }^{8}$ Please recall that $\mathcal{A L C}$ looses the finite tree model property if general TBoxes are taken into account. There are either cyclical models, or infinite tree models, and this can be shown easily using an unraveling construction like the ones given above.

